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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Court by § 78-2-2(3)(j), U.C.A. This is an appeal 
from a judgment, dated April 23, 1990, of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. Notice of Appeal was filed May 23, 1990. On July 31, 1990, this 
case was transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Supreme Court pursuant to § 78-2-2(4), 
U.C.A. On February 20, 1992, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District 
Court. A new judgment was entered by the District Court on January 11, 1993. Notice of 
Appeal was filed February 10, 1993. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
POINT I THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE MANDATE OF THIS 
COURT ON REMAND BY MERELY BOLSTERING THE CONCLUSION 
ALREADY REACHED AND BY REFUSING TO MAKE FINDINGS ON THE 
ISSUES OF FORFEITURE AND RENT. 
Standard of Review: Correctness, since this is entirely a matter for the 
appellate court to determine. 
POINT II NEW WEST IS BOUND BY THE TWENTY PERCENT AGREEMENT AS 
A PARTY TO IT, BY THE REPRESENTATIONS OF ITS AGENT AS TO THE 
EFFECT THEREOF, AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO TERRACE FALLS 
OR UNDER THIRD-PARTY-BENEFICIARY THEORY. 
Standard of Review: 
A. Construction of several agreements together as one agreement is an issue of 
law reviewed for correctness. Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake 
City, 740 P.2d 1357, 1358 (Utah App. 1987). 
B. Ambiguity of the agreements is an issue of law reviewed for correctness. 
Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). Construction of extrinsic 
evidence to resolve the ambiguity is a matter of fact reviewed under the clearly 
v 
erroneous standard, Craig Food Industries, Inc. v. Weihing, 746 P.2d 279 (Utah 
App. 1987), unless no regard need be given to the demeanor of witnesses and 
those facts were determined based on what was considered to be reasonable. 
Reasonableness is a matter of law reviewed for correctness. First Sec. Bank of 
Utah v. Maxwell. 659 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1983). 
C. Actual or apparent authority of an agent involves mixed questions of law and 
fact which "do not require the deference due to findings on questions of pure 
fact." Mareulies v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985). Deference is 
to be accorded to facts found by the lower court from disputed evidence but the 
legal conclusions resulting from those facts are questions of law which are 
reviewed for correctness. Bellon v. Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991). 
However, facts determined based on what was considered to be reasonable are 
reviewed for correctness. First Sec. Bank of Utah v. Maxwell, 659 P.2d 1078 
(Utah 1983). 
D and E. Interpretation of an agreement is a matter of law reviewed for 
correctness. Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357, 
1358 (Utah App. 1987). 
POINT III MARGETTS WAS INDUCED TO ENTER INTO THE AGREEMENTS 
WITH AMERICAN AND TO RELEASE HIS LIEN BY IMPROPER 
CONDUCT, WHETHER TERMED FRAUD, DURESS, COERCION, MISTAKE, 
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION, UNCONSCIONABHJTY, OR UNFAIR 
DEALING AND IS ENTITLED TO RESCISSION OR DAMAGES. 
Standard of Review: Deference is to be accorded to facts found by the 
lower court from disputed evidence but the legal conclusions resulting from those 
facts are questions of law which are reviewed for correctness. Bellon v. Malnar, 
808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991). 
POINT IV IF THE CONDOMINIUM PURCHASE AGREEMENT IS NOT 
ENFORCED IN MARGETTS' FAVOR, HE IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT 
FOR THE PAYMENTS MADE OR CREDIT GIVEN UNDER THE 
CONTRACT BASED ON UNCONSCIONABLE FORFEITURE. 
Standard of Review: Unconscionability is a matter of law revic ble for 
correctness. No findings were made by the lower court on this issue b those 
facts are not in dispute. Therefore, this issue is a matter of law to be re wed 
for correctness. Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991). 
POINT V THE JUDGMENT AGAINST MARGETTS FOR THE FAIR REN \L 
VALUE IN THE AMOUNT OF $17,100 WAS UNSUPPORTED BY HE 
EVIDENCE OR THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND IS CONTRARY TO L VV. 
vi 
Standard of Review: The facts are not in dispute so whether those facts 
support the claim for rent is a legal conclusion to be reviewed for correctness. 
Gravson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). 
POINT VI THE JUDGMENT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER FOR $21,600 IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS NOR THE LAW AND MUST BE REVERSED. 
Standard of Review: The facts are not in dispute so whether those facts 
support the claim of unlawful detainer is a question of law to be reviewed for 
correctness. Asav v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988). 
POINT VII THE JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES MUST BE OVERTURNED 
BECAUSE IT IS NOT BASED ON ANY STATUTE OR AGREEMENT NOR 
SUPPORTED BY ANY EVIDENCE. 
Standard of Review: Since there was no evidence introduced on the 
question of attorney's fees, the propriety of the award of attorney's fees is 
entirely a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. Commerce Financial 
v. Markwest Corp.. 806 P.2d 200, 202 (Utah App. 1990). 
POINT VIII THE AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST WAS CONTRARY TO 
LAW SINCE THE DAMAGES COULD NOT BE CALCULATED PRECISELY 
AND WERE FOR THE TRIER-OF-FACT TO DETERMINE. 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Shoreline Development, Inc. v. Utah 
County, 835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah App. 1992). 
STATUTES AND RULES TO BE INTERPRETED 
§ 78-36-3, Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-36-6, Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-36-10, Utah Code Annotated 
(See Addendum for full text). 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
NEW WEST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, a California 
corporation, successor-in-
interest to AMERICAN SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a California 
corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
JOHN L. MARGETTS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 930450-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff New West Federal Savings and Loan Association (hereinafter referred 
to as "New West") filed a complaint against defendant John L. Margetts (hereinafter 
referred to as "Margetts") to enforce an agreement to buy a condominium unit from New 
West or, in the alternative, to obtain possession of the property and a judgment for the 
rental value of the property. Margetts' answer asserted that he was coerced into signing the 
purchase agreement by fraud and duress and the simultaneous signing of another agreement 
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which would have given him credit for the full amount of the purchase price for the 
condominium unit and also into giving up a trust deed lien against the whole condominium 
project. He counterclaimed for a deed to the unit, for offsets for expenses paid to complete 
the unit, for the value of sales of other units made by Margetts for New West and for the 
value of Margetts' security services in the project. 
Course of the Proceedings 
After Trial the lower court entered judgment in favor of New West in the 
amount of $32,031.00 for rental of the unit, prejudgment interest and treble damages, plus 
attorney's fees of $20,515.00 and terminating any interest of Margetts in the condominium 
and granting possession thereof to New West. A Notice of Appeal was filed on May 23, 
1990, and the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals on July 31, 1990. After Briefing 
and oral argument, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court for failure 
to make sufficient findings of fact and remanded the case on the issues of agency, fraud and 
remedies with instructions to "clarify in its ruling why both forfeiture and rent are being 
awarded" and "with leave to conduct such further proceedings as the trial court may deem 
appropriate." The Court of Appeals further stated "we do not intend our remand to be 
merely an exercise in bolstering and supporting the conclusion already reached." 
Disposition in the Lower Court 
On remand, New West merely submitted supplemental findirgs of fact and 
conclusions of law to bolster and support the conclusion already reached id, without 
conducting further proceedings except oral argument by counsel, the lower cc t adopted 
those supplemental findings and conclusions with only minor changes in wording. The lower 
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court did not enter any further findings on the issue of remedies and did not clarify why both 
forfeiture and rent were awarded. New West submitted a form of judgment to the lower 
court which included an award of attorney's fees incurred after remand. After objection by 
Margetts, the lower court entered a new judgment on January 11, 1993, striking out the 
award of attorney's fees incurred after remand, but again awarding New West a judgment 
in the amount of $32,031.00 for rental of the unit, prejudgment interest and treble damages, 
plus attorney's fees of $20,515.00 and terminating any interest of Margetts in the 
condominium and granting possession thereof to New West. The judgment also awarded 
New West additional prejudgment interest on the entire judgment to the date thereof. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On October 3, 1980, Margetts entered into an Exchange Agreement with 
Garden Falls Condominiums, the predecessor in interest of New West, by which Margetts 
agreed to exchange a condominium in Park City for a condominium in what later became 
known as Terrace Falls Condominiums at Third Avenue and "A" Street in Salt Lake City. 
Because the Terrace Falls Condominiums had not yet been built, Margetts was given a Trust 
Deed on the Terrace Falls Condominiums as security for conveyance to him of the 
completed condominium. 
2. On December 9, 1981, Garden Falls Condominiums persuaded Margetts to 
enter into a new agreement, a Condominium Acquisition Agreement, with Terrace Falls 
Condominiums, a limited partnership, the new name for Garden Falls Condominiums, by 
which Margetts would receive credit towards the purchase of a designated condominium unit 
in the project of $200,000.00 plus 15% thereof per year from December 9, 1981 until the 
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date of closing in return for a subordination of his Trust Deed against the project to 
construction financing (Exh.2). A new trust deed in favor of Margetts was recorded 
December 22, 1981 (Exh. 3). Other parties with claims similar to Margetts' also 
subordinated their liens against the property (R. 538, p.32). 
3. By September of 1984, the condominium project was only partially completed, 
the construction financing with American was in default and Terrace Falls Condominiums 
had agreed to deed the project to American in lieu of foreclosure upon obtaining releases 
of the liens of other creditors in order to avoid the negative publicity of a foreclosure and 
accomplish a smooth, quick and easy transition (R. 538, pp. 39-41). A written Real Property 
Purchase and Sale Agreement (Exh. 4) was prepared and eventually signed by which 
American purchased from Terrace Falls Condominiums the entire project including all 
personal and intangible property such as "the business of selling or leasing units, or the 
ownership or rental of condominiums," the name "Terrace Falls," and "any other rights of 
[Terrace Falls] or its predecessor in interest in connection with the Property" (Exh. 4, H 2). 
4. On September 6, 1984, Gerald Snow, an attorney, called Margetts' attorney, 
requesting Margetts to meet with Lee Stevens of American Savings & Loan, the construction 
lender on the Terrace Falls Condominiums, on September 12, 1984 (R.539, p.292). This was 
followed by a letter from Gerald Snow, dated September 7, 1984, confirming this request 
(Exh. 5). 
5. At the meeting on September 12, 1984, Mr. Snow and Mr. St, ^ns of 
American Savings & Loan told Margetts that Terrace Falls Condominiums and its pr ipals 
were insolvent and that American Savings and Loan was going to foreclose its fii trust 
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deed against the Terrace Falls Condominiums and cut off all of Margetts' rights therein 
unless it could obtain a release of all junior liens against the project, including Margetts' 
trust deed. Mr. Snow and Mr. Stevens offered Mr. Margetts $20,000.00 for a release of his 
trust deed against the condominium project. Margetts refused this offer and left the 
meeting. Mr. Snow called later to increase the offer to $50,000.00 or a credit of $150,000.00 
towards the purchase of a condominium (R. 539, pp. 203-4; R. 538, pp. 61-63). 
6. Mr. Snow prepared and delivered several agreements (Condominium 
Purchase Agreement, Settlement Agreement, General Release, and Request for 
Reconveyance-Exh. 6-9, 15), giving Margetts the $150,000.00 credit and made several 
requests of Margetts and his attorney over the next two months that the agreements be 
signed and returned because all other lien holders had settled and Margetts was holding up 
the whole settlement (R. 539, pp.268-274, 206-207; R. 538, p. 135). Margetts refused to do 
so. 
7. Because Margetts was leaving town for two weeks and Mr. Snow was anxious 
to conclude a settlement with Margetts, Mr. Snow arranged a meeting with Margetts, without 
his attorney, on November 14, 1984. Margetts again refused to sign the agreements (R. 538, 
pp. 125-6; R. 539, p. 210). Mr. Snow asked him to return that afternoon at which time Mr. 
Snow thought he could present a better deal to him (R. 539, p. 211). 
8. Margetts met with Mr. Snow again that afternoon at which time he was 
presented with an additional agreement with Terrace Falls Condominiums (Exh. 10 and 16) 
which would give him an additional credit towards the purchase of the designated 
condominium unit of 20% of the proceeds of the sale of other units in the condominium 
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project as an inducement to get him to sign the previously prepared condominium purchase 
agreement, settlement agreement, general release, and request for reconveyance. Mr. Snow 
assured Margetts that the other agreements would not be delivered until this twenty percent 
agreement was signed and that American Savings would be bound by that agreement. Mr. 
Margetts thereupon signed all the agreements (R. 538, pp. 139-140; R. 539, pp. 212-214). 
He further told Margetts that he would get what he wanted by that agreement, that only 
seven condominiums had to be sold to completely pay for his condominium, and that 
American Savings did not have to sign the agreement to be bound by it because American 
would be Terrace Falls Condominiums. 
9. Margetts' trust deed in the project was reconveyed (Exh. 11) and Terrace 
Falls Condominiums gave to American Savings and Loan a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure 
conveying the entire project to American and American took over the completion and 
operation of the project (Exh. 4). 
10. These agreements called for the closing of the sale of the condominium unit 
to Margetts after it was ready for occupancy and certain specified finish items had been 
completed in the unit, which would be no later than June 30, 1985 (Exh. 6,11 6; Exh. 7,1f 6). 
11. American did not complete the unit by June 30, 1985 and did not finish the 
unit as required by the agreement (Exh. 22, 24-27). Margetts paid some $9,234.00 of his 
own money to finish the unit (R. 465, p.3) and he was told by American's attorney to move 
into the unit on August 25, 1985 even though American did not have a certificate of 
occupancy and could not deliver title to Margetts (R.539, p. 226-8). 
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12. After Margetts moved into the unit, American dismissed their security 
personnel on the project relying on Margetts' presence in the project as security for the 
whole project (R. 539, p. 233). 
13. American did not form the owners association for the condominium project 
until September 1, 1987 and told Margetts not to pay any assessments, taxes, or rent on the 
unit (R. 539, pp. 233-5). 
14. In reliance on the twenty percent agreement signed as an inducement for 
Margetts to enter into the Condominium Purchase Agreement and other agreements, 
Margetts persuaded five of his acquaintances to buy condominium units in the project (R. 
539, p. 230). 
15. When American was finally prepared to close the transaction and convey 
title to Margetts, it refused to give him credit for 20% of the proceeds of units sold to 
purchasers obtained by Margetts or for the cost of finish items paid by Margetts. It also 
refused to allow him to select another unit as provided in the agreements. 
16. On March 25, 1989, New West, as the successor-in-interest to American, 
caused a Notice to Quit to be mailed to Margetts demanding that he vacate the unit within 
five (5) days (R. 538, p. 178). 
17. When Margetts did not vacate the unit, New West commenced this action 
for unlawful detainer (R. 2-24) and Margetts filed a counterclaim asserting that he was 
entitled to a deed to the unit, that he was induced by fraud and deception to surrender his 
trust deed on the project and to pay an additional $134,283.00 for his unit and that he was 
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entitled to a credit for the finish items paid for by him and further amounts for security 
services against the purchase price of his unit (R. 27-51). 
18. Trial was held November 14-16, 1989, resulting in the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R. 512-20) and Judgment (R. 522-24), dated April 23, 1990, which 
judgment included rent prior to the Notice to Quit and prejudgment interest thereon as well 
as treble damages after the Notice to Quit and attorneys' fees incurred in obtaining 
possession of the condominium unit. 
19. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the case was transferred to the Court of 
Appeal and, after hearing, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court for 
failure to make sufficient findings of fact and remanded the case on the issues of agency, 
fraud and remedies with instructions to "clarify in its ruling why both forfeiture and rent are 
being awarded" and "with leave to conduct such further proceedings as the trial court may 
deem appropriate." The Court of Appeals further stated "we do not intend our remand to 
be merely an exercise in bolstering and supporting the conclusion already reached (R. 543-
45). 
20. On remand, New West merely submitted supplemental findings of fact and 
conclusions of law to bolster and support the conclusion already reached and, without 
conducting further proceedings except oral argument by counsel, the lower court adopted 
those supplemental findings and conclusions with only minor changes in wordin The lower 
court did not enter any further findings on the issue of remedies and did not claril why both 
forfeiture and rent were awarded (R. 851-862). New West submitted a form of j dgment 
to the lower court which included an award of attorney's fees incurred after rema i. After 
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objection by Margetts, the lower court entered a new judgment on January 11, 1993, striking 
out the award of attorney's fees incurred after remand, but again awarding New West a 
judgment in the amount of $32,031.00 for rental of the unit, prejudgment interest and treble 
damages, plus attorney's fees of $20,515.00 and terminating any interest of Margetts in the 
condominium and granting possession thereof to New West. The judgment also awarded 
New West additional prejudgment interest on the entire judgment to the date thereof (R. 
872-74). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THIS COURTS REMAND MANDATE. 
In remanding this case for further findings and conclusions, this court specifically 
directed the lower court to conduct further proceedings as necessary in order that the 
remand would not be an exercise in bolstering and supporting the conclusion already 
reached. Express directions were given to reconsider the issues of agency, fraud and 
remedies, especially the forfeiture of Margetts' interest in the condominium. The lower 
court failed to follow this mandate and simply entered supplemental findings and conclusions 
which had been prepared and submitted by New West. It failed to make any findings on 
the issue of forfeiture as directed. 
II. NEW WEST IS BOUND BY TERRACE FALLS' TWENTY PERCENT AGREEMENT. 
New West has based this action on documents which Margetts adamantly refused 
to sign until he was presented with the Twenty Percent Agreement as incentive and 
inducement to sign the others. They were all signed at the same time and as a part of the 
same transaction and must be construed together as one agreement. That means that New 
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West is jointly bound with Terrace Falls to perform the promises made to Margetts in return 
for the release of his lien. The total agreement is inconsistent, unenforceable and void 
unless Margetts' view of the total agreement is adopted. Only that view makes any sense 
and preserves the total agreement. 
Snow was authorized by American to act for it in obtaining a release from 
Margetts. Whatever he did and represented in the course of obtaining that release is 
binding on American. If actual authority was not present, the facts show that American 
placed Snow in a position where all offers and communications came through him and 
Margetts was justified in relying on Snow's actions and representations. American and its 
successor, New West, are bound by the representations Snow made to Margetts as to the 
effect of the agreement he was signing. 
New West's predecessor purchased everything owned by Terrace Falls, leaving 
it with nothing. It purchased the name 'Terrace Falls" and the business of selling 
condominiums. It agreed to pay any sums required to be paid to obtain the release from 
Margetts. It intentionally chose to step into Terrace Falls' shoes rather than foreclose and 
terminate Margetts' interest. It still does business as Terrace Falls Condominiums and is 
selling the units from which Margetts' unit was to be paid for. New West is obligated to 
perform the agreement with Margetts and honor the representations made to him by 
crediting him with twenty percent of the proceeds of the sales of other units. Mai etts is 
also the third party beneficiary of the Real Estate Purchase Agreement between Tt ace 
Falls and American and is entitled to enforce directly against New West the benefits to )w 
to Margetts from the total agreement between the parties. 
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III. MARGETTS IS ENTITLED TO RESCISSION OR DAMAGES. 
The representations made to Margetts induced him to give up his lien on the 
property. Therefore, if he does not receive the credit towards the purchase of his unit, he 
is entitled to rescission and reinstatement of his lien or damages for his loss on the grounds 
of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, duress, mistake, unconscionability or unfair dealing. 
IV. MARGETTS IS ENTITLED TO A $142,134 JUDGMENT FOR UNCONSCIONABLE 
FORFEITURE OF HIS PAYMENTS AND CREDIT UNDER THE AGREEMENT. 
Margetts has lost in excess of $300,000 on this transaction for which American 
agreed to give him credit of $150,000 in return for substantial value flowing to American. 
When American refused to close the sale of the condominium on the terms represented to 
him, American, without properly terminating the agreement, brought this action. The lower 
court terminated Margetts' interest in the condominium and forfeited his $150,000 plus the 
$9,234 he paid to complete the unit. American's only damages were $17,100 in rental value 
which is unconscionably disproportionate to the amount forfeited. Margetts is entitled to 
a judgment for the difference. 
V. THE JUDGMENT FOR RENT HAS NO BASIS IN LAW OR FACT. 
A judgment for rent must be based either on an agreement to pay rent or on 
unjust enrichment. There was no agreement to pay rent and New West did not plead nor 
prove the essential elements of unjust enrichment. Most importantly, New West received 
a substantial benefit from Margetts' occupancy and Margetts suffered a substantial detriment 
in not receiving his condominium. Under those circumstances it cannot be concluded that 
it is inequitable for Margetts to retain any benefit he may have received by temporarily 
occupying the condominium. 
11 
VI. NEW WEST WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO PROCEED UNDER THE UNLAWFUL 
DETAINER STATUTE AND THE JUDGMENT MUST BE REVERSED. 
New West attempted to take advantage of the severe and summary remedies of 
the Unlawful Detainer Statute without complying with its strict requirements. There was no 
periodic tenancy and no conversion of that tenancy to a tenancy at will. The Notice to Quit 
was not served on Margetts as required by statute and was not served on his wife at all. 
Furthermore, his wife was not even joined in this action so any unlawful detainer by 
Margetts caused no loss to New West because she still had the right of possession. At most, 
only nominal damages could be awarded. 
VIL THERE WAS NO CONTRACT, STATUTE OR EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
An award of attorney's fees must be supported by evidence. No evidence was 
submitted to the lower court. There was no statute which authorized attorney's fees and the 
only contract which provided for fees was not in dispute and no judgment was obtained 
under that contract. In fact, New West abandoned its claim under that contract. That 
contract, the Condominium Purchase Agreement, was only in dispute if the court held the 
Twenty Percent Agreement to be a part of that contract, in which event Margetts must 
prevail on the merits and attorney's fees should be awarded to him. 
VIII. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IS NOT ALLOWABLE. 
The prejudgment interest included in the first judgment was calculatec i what 
the court found to be the fair rental value of the property. That finding is the prov, e of 
the trier-of-fact from the testimony of experts and, therefore, could not have xn 
determined at the time with mathematical certainty. The amount of the second judg ent 
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for rental value, unlawful detainer and attorney's fees could also not be calculated in 
advance with mathematical precision and the award of prejudgment interest thereon was 
error. Prejudgment interest may not be included in the judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE 
MANDATE OF THIS COURT ON REMAND BY MERELY 
BOLSTERING THE CONCLUSION ALREADY REACHED AND 
BY REFUSING TO MAKE FINDINGS ON THE ISSUES OF 
FORFEITURE AND RENT. 
The Memorandum Decision of this Court remanded the case on the issues of 
agency, fraud and remedies for lack of sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
also directed the lower court to "clarify in its ruling why both forfeiture and rent are being 
awarded." The Decision further stated that "we do not intend our remand to be merely an 
exercise in bolstering and supporting the conclusion already reached" and granted "leave to 
conduct such further proceedings as the trial court may deem appropriate." (R. 545-46). 
A. The lower court failed to conduct further proceedings which 
would allow it to do more than "bolster" its prior conclusion. 
This Court's remand recognized how easy it is for the lower court, having once 
made a decision, to bolster that decision with whatever findings are required to support it. 
That is a natural inclination, especially years after the decision. And certainly a prevailing 
party would be inclined to submit to the court proposed findings and conclusions to bolster 
the prior conclusion in its favor. Despite this Court's direction to the contrary, that is 
precisely what happened on remand of this case. New West's attorneys merely submitted 
proposed supplemental findings and conclusions which filled in the some of the holes found 
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by this Court on the prior appeal and the lower court, with only minor changes in wording, 
adopted those proposed supplemental findings and conclusions intact, after hearing the 
arguments of the parties but without taking any further evidence or conducting further 
proceedings. The deficiencies in this procedure become apparent when the transcript of the 
lower court's actual findings and conclusions made from the bench at the conclusion of the 
trial on November 16, 1989, (as opposed to what New West prepared and finally came 
before the court for signing more than five months later on April 23, 1990) is compared to 
the findings and conclusions made by the court at the conclusion of the hearing on remand.1 
At the conclusion of the trial the lower court did not even consider the agency 
and authority of Mr. Snow to be an issue. The court stated: 
I think, unfortunately, we lost ourselves in the forest of authority 
and agency, and avoided the inevitable problems the Court is stuck 
with in construing contract law under consistently recognized 
principles in the State of Utah. [R. 469, lines 6-10]. 
In this particular case, whether you conclude ~ if you were to 
conclude that Mr. Snow was acting with apparent authority or 
ostensible authority, you've still got the contracts and the agreements 
1
 This case illustrates what, for this advocate, has been a frustrating departure in 
practice from what the rules require. Rule 52, U.R.C.P., states that "the court shall find the 
facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon." In practice the court 
directs the prevailing party to prepare findings and conclusions and to submit them to the 
court. The prevailing party then submits detailed findings and conclusions which best 
support the decision in its favor but often go far beyond what the court actu 1y found. 
When these are challenged by the opposing party and a hearing held, often weeks iter, the 
court has forgotten many of the details of the case and is inclined to adopt the fine <*s and 
conclusions as submitted. It is recognized that it would be an additional burden on t :ourt 
to prepare and make detailed findings and conclusions at the conclusion of t but 
experience shows that the time required and the burden on the court would be far le^ than 
that required by the lengthy and sometimes numerous hearings held on objections ) and 
motions to amend findings and conclusions. 
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to consider. And the one agreement, the 20 Percent Agreement, is 
performable by Terrace Falls and its principals, not by American 
Savings. [R. 470, line 21-471, line 2]. 
That is the extent of the court's comments on agency and authority. It did not even 
determine whose version of the conversation between Margetts and Snow was accurate. 
That was also not an issue in the court's mind. It proceeded only to determine whether 
fraud had been proved, claiming that was the only basis on which the court could avoid the 
language of the Twenty Percent Agreement. [R. 471, lines 3-6]. Its conclusion that fraud 
had not been proved was not based on what was said or whether agency existed but entirely 
on the language of the Twenty Percent Agreement and Margetts' supposed knowledge that 
that agreement did not say what Snow told him it said [R. 471, lines 7-21] ignoring entirely 
the pressure which Snow placed on Margetts to sign the agreements that day in the absence 
of his attorney and Margetts inability to confirm what Snow was telling him. 
So the court did not focus on who told the truth and didn't think it necessary to 
decide that or the issue of agency. The theory is that the trier of fact is to determine the 
credibility of witnesses based on demeanor and other factors that may not show in the 
printed transcript. But the court in this case did not do that because it wasn't important to 
its decision. Three years later, however, without taking further evidence, the court adopted 
the findings prepared by the victor to "bolster" the prior decision and claims it can now 
determine whose version of the facts was true. Yet, looking at the cold transcript three 
years later, the lower court was in no better position to judge credibility than is the appellate 
court. This is confirmed by the reason given by the lower court for now determining whose 
version of the facts was true. That reason is not based upon the demeanor of the witnesses 
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nor anything else that does not appear in the record. It is based solely on the court's 
conclusion that Margetts was an experienced business man2 who should have demanded 
that Snow put his statements in writing and, therefore, it was not reasonable for Margetts 
to rely upon any representations or conduct of Snow. The court stated that "it was not 
reasonable for Defendant Margetts to rely upon any assumed representations or conduct by 
Mr. Snow." [R. 925, lines 17-19]. 
What is reasonable is a matter of law and can be determined by the appellate 
court. A careful review of all of the undisputed facts shows that Margetts' version of the 
conversation with Snow is the only reasonable view. That is demonstrated in Point II.B 
below. The Supplemental Findings were quite obviously submitted by New West and 
adopted by the lower court in an attempt to "bolster" the conclusion previously reached by 
filling in the holes found to exist by this Court on the prior appeal. Thus, the lower court 
has failed to carry out the mandate given by this Court on remand to conduct further 
proceedings which would enable it to make appropriate findings on the issues of agency and 
fraud. 
B. The lower court failed to conduct further proceedings on the 
issue of remedies or to clarify why both forfeiture and rent were 
awarded. 
This Court's opinion stated that because the remand 
2. It is interesting to note that there is little or no evidence in the record of rgetts' 
business experience. The only evidence was that he had training as an engineer aiu orkcd 
in and for businesses as an engineer and that he had no training as an attorney. , . 538, 
pp. 198-9, 242-3]. The lower court's conclusion on this point seemed to be based or e fact 
that Margetts "appeared . . . to be a senior citizen" and "had been around and ha * some 
ability." [R. 920-1]. 
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may affect the determination of who is at fault for failure to close 
the sale, as well as the question of whether Margetts forfeited his 
$150,000 credit, we also remand the issue of remedies. In the event 
that the trial court again awards a similar combination of remedies, 
the trial court should clarify in its ruling why both forfeiture and rent 
are being awarded. [R. 545]. 
This remand clearly required the lower court to justify the forfeiture of Margetts' substantial 
interest in the condominium while at the same time awarding rent and other damages to 
New West. Yet, no additional findings were made on this point and the conclusions [R. 861-
2] merely repeated the conclusions previously entered [R. 518]. In addressing this question 
in its ruling from the bench, the lower court stated that "there's perhaps some confusion on 
the part of the Appellate Court" [R. 926] and, while it recognized merit in the arguments 
of counsel, did not feel that they were included in the remand. [R.930-1]. Therefore, the 
lower court either misunderstood the remand order or ignored it. In any event, it made no 
clarification of its ruling which forfeited Margetts' interest in the condominium while 
awarding damages to New West. The importance of this issue is demonstrated in Point IV 
below. The failure of the lower court to address this issue, although it recognized the merit 
of it, requires a reversal of its judgment and an award of damages to Margetts. 
POINT II 
NEW WEST IS BOUND BY THE TWENTY PERCENT 
AGREEMENT AS A PARTY TO IT, BY THE REPRESENTATIONS 
OF ITS AGENT AS TO THE EFFECT THEREOF, AS 
SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO TERRACE FALLS OR UNDER 
THIRD-PARTY-BENEFICIARY THEORY. 
A. New West is bound by the Twenty Percent Agreement as a 
party to it because it was an essential part of the total agreement 
between the parties. 
It is clear from the testimony of Margetts and Snow that Margetts would not 
have signed the Condominium Purchase Agreement, Settlement Agreement, General 
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Release and Request for Reconveyance if the Twenty Percent Agreement were not part of 
the total agreement. He had already refused to sign those other agreements several times 
including on the morning of November 14, 1984, when he met with Snow. On that occasion, 
Snow told him to come back later that day because "maybe there's a way that we can get 
you Condominium 413" [R. 539, p. 211]. When Margetts returned Snow presented him with 
the Twenty Percent Agreement as an "incentive" [R. 539, p. 211] and explained to him that 
"they only have to sell seven condominiums and your condominium will be paid for" [R.. 539, 
p. 212] and that Margetts would get what he wanted by such an agreement [R. 539, p. 213]. 
Margetts was clearly induced to sign the other documents by the presentation of the Twenty 
Percent Agreement and would not have signed those documents without it [R. 538, p. 130, 
R. 539, p. 219]. Snow even wrote on the Twenty Percent Agreement that the others would 
not be delivered unless the Twenty Percent Agreement was signed and delivered 
simultaneously [Exh. 16, R. 538, p. 134]. 
Under these circumstances the principle set forth in Bullfrog Marina Inc. v. 
Lentz, 28 U.2d 261, 501 P.2d 266, 270-71 (Utah 1972) applies: 
[T]he trial court found that after full consideration of the entire 
transaction, including the purpose to be served by the lease and the 
employment contract, defendant would not have leased the boats to 
plaintiff, unless he could operate the houseboat rental service. The 
trial court concluded that the lease and employment contract bore 
a relationship to one another and should be considered as one 
agreement. . . . [W]here two or more instruments are executed by 
the same parties contemporaneously, or at different times in the 
course of the same transaction, and concern the same subject matter, 
they will be read and construed together so far as determining the 
respective rights and interests of the parties although they do not in 
terms refer to each other. 
See also Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357 (Utah 1987); 
Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225 (Utah 1987); First Security Bank v. 
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Maxwell 659 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1983). Likewise the agreements to purchase the 
condominium and to release the trust deed would not have been signed without the Twenty 
Percent Agreement. They should be considered as one agreement. 
B. The total agreement between the parties is so ambiguous as 
to be unenforceable and void unless Margetts' view of that 
agreement is adopted. Only that view makes any sense and shows 
a meeting of the minds. 
New West has, in Point I of its brief on the prior appeal, argued that the 
Condominium Purchase Agreement was clear and unambiguous on its face and, therefore, 
not subject to modification by extrinsic evidence. That argument may have validity when 
applied to the Condominium Purchase Agreement itself. But that document is not the 
agreement between the parties that is at issue in this case and that argument ignores the 
reason for the entire dispute. It is without dispute that Margetts had refused to sign any 
agreement with American until the Twenty Percent Agreement was presented to him and 
he was assured that American would be bound by it. The Twenty Percent Agreement was 
signed at the same time and as a part of the same transaction as the Condominium Purchase 
Agreement and it, plus Snow's explanation of it, was the inducement for Margetts to sign 
the Condominium Purchase Agreement. Therefore, the Twenty Percent Agreement was a 
part of the total agreement between the parties and all of these documents must be 
construed together as one agreement. Bullfrog Marina Inc. v. Lentz, supra at 18. 
When these documents are construed together as one agreement, even New 
West admits that they are inconsistent [see Appellee's Brief on prior appeal, p. 10, lines 18-
19] and, therefore, ambiguous. Resort to extrinsic evidence is necessary to resolve the 
ambiguity and that requires the court to consider the statements made by Snow to Margetts 
to induce him to sign the agreements. Those statements, themselves, are admitted by New 
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West to be inconsistent with the agreements [see Appellee's Brief on prior appeal, p. 21, 
lines 4-6] but only those statements explain why Margetts finally signed the documents after 
having refused to do so for so long. Only when Snow told Margetts that he would get what 
he wanted by such an agreement (the condominium he had bargained for), that American 
"will be Terrace Falls Condominiums" and be bound by the agreement and that "they only 
have to sell seven condominiums and your condominium will be paid for" [R. 239, pp. 212-
4]-only then, did Margetts sign the documents. 
Margetts' action in finally signing those documents, after refusing to do so for so 
long, and the inconsistencies in the documents and the statements only make sense if 
American was a party to the total agreement and was bound by it. Otherwise, the total 
agreement is so inconsistent and ambiguous as to be unenforceable and, therefore, void. 
Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 1976); Valcarce v. 
Bitters, 12 U.2d 61, 362 P.2d 427 (1961). Preservation and enforceability of the total 
agreement require that Margetts' view of the transaction be adopted. That requires that he 
be given credit for twenty percent of the sales price of all condominiums sold against the 
purchase price of his unit. 
C. Snow had both actual and apparent authority to act for and 
bind American to the representations he made as to the effect of the 
agreement Margetts signed. 
New West, of course, contends that it is not bound by the Twenty Percent 
Agreement because it was not signed by American Savings even though it has accepted and 
had the benefit of the consideration given by Margetts for that agreement. Margetts, of 
course, only knew what Snow was telling him so the question is whether he was justified in 
relying upon Snow. From the very beginning of these negotiations with American, Snow was 
its spokesman. At the first meeting with a representative of American it was Snow who did 
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the talking [R. 539, p. 264], and it was Snow who made the offer to Margetts [R. 539, p. 
265]. It was clear that the offer was being made by American and that any deal would have 
to be made with American. It would be paying the money or conveying the unit being 
offered. After that meeting it was Snow who called to increase the offer and it was Snow 
who had all further contact with Margetts or his attorney right up to the signing of all of the 
documents by Margetts. It was Snow who drafted the documents presented to Margetts and 
who revised those documents at the request of Margetts. There was no question in 
Margetts' mind that Snow was speaking for and representing American. This was especially 
true when Snow told him "they only have to sell seven condominiums and your condominium 
will be paid for" [R. 539, p. 212], that he would get what he wanted by such an agreement 
[R. 539, p. 213] and American doesn't need to sign the agreement because "with the deed-in-
lieu of foreclosure, they will be Terrace Falls Condominiums" [R. 539, p. 214]. What else 
could Margetts believe but that he represented and was speaking for American? 
1. Snow had actual authority to bind American. 
The principle of agency that governs here was stated in Kline v. MultiMedia 
Cablevision, Inc., 233 Kan. 988, 666 P.2d 711 (1983), in which the court answered a question 
certified to it by a federal court as to when a corporation is liable for punitive damages for 
the wrongful acts of its agent. As a preliminary matter the court set forth these two well-
established legal principles, at 713: 
First, a corporation is liable for the torts of its agent when 
committed within the scope of the agent's authority and course of 
employment even though it did not authorize or ratify the tortious 
acts Russell v. American Rock Crusher Co., 181 Kan. 891, 894, 317 
P.2d 847 (1957). A related rule of law states a principal is 
responsible for the torts of its agent where the tortious acts are 
incidental to and in furtherance of the principal's business, even 
though outside the scope of the agent's authority. Williams v. 
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Community Drive-In Theater, Inc., 214 Kan. 359, 520 P.2d 1296 
(1974). 
If those principles apply to the wrongful acts of the agent, they also apply to acts 
which are not wrongful but are performed to carry out the purposes of the corporation, as 
was the case here. See Ficke v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 524 P.2d 271 (Alaska, 1974), where 
the court held that an attorney retained to negotiate the terms of an agreement binds his 
client to promises made within the scope of that authority although not authorized. And, 
even though New West now claims Snow had no authority to act for its predecessor, he was 
clearly authorized by American to prepare and obtain the signature of Margetts on the 
settlement agreements and it is bound by the acts of Snow which are "incidental to and in 
furtherance of that object "even though outside the scope of his authority. 
Utah cases also hold that a party, including the State, is bound by the acts of 
attorneys which it places in a position where others will rely on those acts. Gorgoza, Inc. 
v. Utah State Road Commission, 553 P.2d 413 (Utah 1976), held that the State was bound 
by an agreement entered into by its attorney which obligated the State to provide access to 
property which the State had not authorized. The court went on, at 415, to point out that 
the state 
proceeded to act pursuant to the agreement and in accordance with 
the benefit it received therefrom, so there is at least some plausibility 
to the idea that it should be deemed to have ratified and/or to be 
estopped from repudiating that contract. 
In a suit brought by the payee of a usurious promissory note against both the 
makers of the note and the attorney who was retained by the makers to draft the note, the 
court in Silver v. George, 618 P.2d 1157 (Haw. App. 1980), held the makers and the attorney 
liable for the damage caused in these words, at 1159: 
my 
We hold that it is a per se violation of an attorney's duty for him to 
draw a note, which is on its face usurious, that that duty runs at least 
to the named parties to the note, including the payee, even though 
the payee did not hire him or pay his fee; that the attorney is the 
agent for his clients in drawing the note; and that his clients should 
not be permitted to be unjustly enriched at the expense of the payee 
when the attorney draws a note which violates the law and thus 
confers a benefit upon his client at the expense of the relying and 
innocent payee. 
While the terms of the agreements themselves, in our case, did not violate the 
law, Margetts innocently relied upon the attorney hired by American to draft those 
agreements and it should not be permitted to be unjustly enriched at the expense of 
Margetts by taking advantage of the benefit conferred upon it by the actions and 
representations of that attorney. 
That American was directly involved in the whole process through Snow and was 
well aware of the benefit it was to receive from the transaction with Margetts is clear from 
the testimony of Snow. He testified as follows: 
If it wasn't satisfactory to American, then the deal wouldn't go 
through; so I had to run the documents past American. [R. 538, p. 
83]. 
And then, in my sending documents back and forth to Roulhac Garn, 
it was clarified what documents were needed and what the form of 
those documents would have to be. 
Q. But, did you talk to Roulhac Garn about that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did she indicate they were mandatory, that those 
documents be signed by Jack Margetts? 
A. She indicated that it was mandatory that Jack Margetts, 
along with all the other lienholders, reconvey their interest in the 
project. [R. 538, pp. 102-3]. 
Q. That intent was communicated to you by someone at 
American? 
A. Yes. [R. 538, p. 113]. 
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. . . did American at any time inform you that they were willing 
to pay your fee in part because the work that you were doing was of 
substantial benefit to American? 
A. Yes. [R. 538, p. 117]. 
Q. So, when you drafted it, revised it, prepared it, negotiated 
about it [referring to Exhibit 7], that was solely for American 
Savings, is that correct? 
A. Yes. [R. 538, p. 123]. 
Question: [Referring to the Twenty Percent Agreement] After 
preparing this, did you discuss this agreement with American? 
Answer: Probably. 
A. Yes. As far as it goes in context, yes. 
Q. Is that what you said? 
A. Yes. [R. 538, p. 133]. 
Even Roulhac Garn, American's San Francisco attorney, who disingenuously denied that 
Snow was American's Salt Lake attorney, admitted the benefit to American of Snow's work: 
Q. Did it prove, also, of value to American Savings? 
A. I don't know, The transaction wouldn't have closed without 
these agreements. 
Q. It was vital then, was it not, that all of these documents be 
signed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And they were all required by the deed-in-lieu agreement 
that you prepared? 
A. Yes. [R. 539, p. 311]. 
American wanted to obtain a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure and a release of all liens against the 
property. It paid Snow to accomplish that. Snow succeeded in accomplishing that only by 
making representations to Margetts which induced him to sign the agreements and release 
his lien against the property. American received the benefit of that release. Tew West, as 
American's successor, has accepted that benefit but now refuses to ret nize the 
representations made by the agent who obtained that benefit. If the principles oi actual or 
apparent authority do not bind New West to those representations, then the principles of 
ratification and estoppel by acceptance of the benefits obtained by those representations do. 
1A 
In making its supplemental finding that Snow did not have actual authority to 
bind American, the lower court ignored all of the following evidence of actual authority: 
(a) By paragraph 3 of the Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure Agreement, Terrace 
Falls and American agreed to cooperate in obtaining releases of liens [Exh. 4, R. 538, p. 48]. 
(b) American agreed to compromise the creditor's claims [Exh. 4, H l.F] and pay 
the amounts required to obtain releases [Exh. 4, If 4.E, R. 538, p. 49]. That required that 
American authorize the amount to be paid, since Terrace Falls was not given a blank check. 
(c) Snow was authorized by American to negotiate the lien claims [R. 538, p.55]. 
(d) Snow was paid for his services by American [R. 538, pp. 56, 98] and 
American considered his services to be of substantial benefit to American [R. 538, p. 117]. 
(e) The intent of American was communicated directly by American to Snow 
and not through others [R. 538, p. 113] and it was American that requested Snow to arrange 
a meeting with the junior lienholders [R. 538, p. 57, Exh. 5]. 
(f) At the first meeting with a representative of American, on September 12, 
1984, it was Snow who did the talking and it was Snow who made the offer to Margetts [R. 
539, pp. 204, 264-5]. Kirton & McConkie played no part in that meeting [R. 538, p. 115]. 
(g) It was clear that the offer was being made on behalf of American who was 
furnishing the money to make the offer [R. 538, p. 61]. 
(h) American authorized an increase in the offer to $50,000 [R. 538, p. 62]. 
(i) After September 12,1984, all dealings between American and Margetts were 
conducted through Snow and Kirton & McConkie was not involved [R. 538, pp. 100-1]. 
(j) Snow, on behalf of American, communicated the increase in the offer to 
Margetts [R. 538, p. 62, R. 539, p. 265]. 
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(k) American authorized an offer of $150,000 credit to Margetts towards the 
purchase of a condominium [R. 538, pp. 63-4]. 
(1) Snow, on behalf of American, communicated this credit offer to Margetts [R. 
538, p. 63, R. 539, p. 265]. 
(m) Snow prepared the documents for American, presented them to Margetts 
and revised those documents at the request of Margetts [R. 538, pp. 53, 65, R. 539, p. 270]. 
(n) The documents were reviewed by American and approved by it and Snow 
had the approval of American for all that he was doing [R. 538, pp. 82-3, 102-3]. 
The only evidence that Snow did not represent American was the denial that he 
represented American by Snow and American, both made after the fact. Snow did not make 
any statements to Margetts or his attorney in the Fall of 1984 as to whom he was 
representing [R. 538, p. I l l ] so all conclusions as to whom he was representing must be 
based on actions or other statements made. New West claims that the fact that Snow 
represented Terrace Falls and that Kirton & McConkie represented American is evidence 
that Snow did not represent American. It is irrelevant that American may have been 
represented by other attorneys or that Snow may also have represented Terrace Falls. He 
could and did represent both American and Terrace Falls in obtaining the releases. Even 
if Snow and American said he did not represent American, that does not change the fact 
that he did so by taking instructions directly from American, conveying those in? mictions to 
Margetts and conveying Margetts' responses back to American, preparing the doct a,nts for 
American, delivering those to American and by American accepting those docum s and 
paying Snow his fees incurred in doing so. American gave Snow authority to act ft it and 
it is, therefore, bound by anything he did in carrying out American's directions to obtain a 
release from Margetts. 
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Whenever the performance of certain business is confided to an 
agent, such authority carries with it, by implication, authority to do 
collateral acts which are the natural and ordinary incidents of the 
main act or business authorized. Bowen v. Olsen, 576 P.2d 862, 864 
(Utah 1978). 
This authority applies even to acts of the agent which were not authorized by the principal 
so long as they are within the scope of the agent's employment. See Kline v. Multi-Media 
Cablevision, Inc.: Ficke v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., supra, at 21-22. Therefore, what Margetts 
knew about that authority and the facts which relate only to the question of apparent 
authority are superfluous. Snow had actual authority to act for American and it is bound 
by his representations made to Margetts in obtaining from him the release that he had been 
authorized to obtain. 
2. Snow had apparent authority to bind American. 
The superfluous facts referred to above are sufficient to establish that Mr. Snow 
had apparent authority, in addition to his actual authority, to act for and to bind American. 
In Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah 1980), the referral by a seller to her 
attorney of a letter written to her by the buyers was held to be sufficient to clothe the 
attorney with apparent authority to act for the seller. Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 
672 P.2d 73, 74 (Utah 1983), also upheld the principle of apparent authority and stated the 
rule of law as follows: 
Apparent authority exists: ,f[W]here a person has created such an 
appearance of things that it causes a third party reasonably and 
prudently to believe that a second party has the power to act on 
behalf of the first person . . . ." Wynn v. McMahon Ford Co., 414 
S.W.2d 330, 336 (Mo. App. 1967). 
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From the very first meeting of the parties every statement on behalf of American, every 
offer made by American, every document relating to the transaction and every 
communication back to American from Margetts was made by or passed through Snow. 
This was true even when American's admitted agent, Mr. Lee Stevens, was present. Snow 
spoke for him and relayed Margetts' responses back to him. American clearly "created such 
an appearance of things that it caused" Margetts "reasonably and prudently to believe that" 
Snow had "the power to act on behalf of American. New West is, therefore, bound by the 
acts of its predecessor's agent, including the representations made by that agent as to the 
effect of the total agreement. 
This principle has also been held to apply to the acts of an attorney who did not 
actually represent the party bound by those acts. In Arizona Title Ins. and Trust Co. v. 
Pace, 8 Ariz. App. 269, 445 P.2d 471 (1968), a title insurance company retained an attorney 
to defend its insured on a claim on which it had denied coverage. The attorney settled the 
claim for $4,750.00 which the insured paid. The insured then sued the title insurance 
company to recover the amount paid to settle. The question presented to the court was 
whether the insurance company was bound by the settlement entered into by the insured's 
attorney, who was hired and paid by the insurer. The court held, at 473-4: 
However, if the client places the attorney in a position where third 
persons of ordinary prudence and discretion would be justified in 
assuming the attorney was acting within his authority, then the client 
is bound by the acts of the attorney within the scope of his appa *nt 
authority . . . . 
. . . . The appellant retained an attorney who, although named as ai 
attorney of record for the defendants-insured, was primarily involved 
in the litigation to protect the interests of the insurer. The attorney 
regularly advised the insurer, through its managing agent, of the 
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progress of the litigation. The insurer was fully aware of the fact 
that the appellees construed Ellis's representation of them to be 
nominal only and that Ellis was acting for the insurer. Therefore, 
when Ellis advised compromise of the Bailey's claim and volunteered 
to effect it on behalf of the appellees, they were justified in assuming 
that he had authority to do so. Under such circumstances, appellant 
is estopped to assert otherwise and is thereby bound by the act of its 
attorney. 
Here we have a similar situation where Snow nominally represented Terrace 
Falls but was paid by, gave advice to and took direction from American. The only difference 
was that Margetts was on the other side of the matter and would be less likely to know of 
any lack of authority of Snow to act for American. Our case is, therefore, a stronger one 
for holding that Snow had apparent authority to act for American and that Margetts was 
justified in assuming he had authority. 
D. New West is bound by the Twenty Percent Agreement as the 
successor-in-interest to Terrace Falls. 
New West has suggested that the purpose of the Twenty Percent Agreement was 
to allow Margetts to participate in any windfall or kickback that might be paid to Terrace 
Falls after the deed-in-lieu to American. This suggestion makes no sense since Terrace Falls 
was conveying its entire interest in the project and retained no rights to receive anything 
back from American. [Exh. 4, 1IH 2, 8.A]. And, of course, anything that might have gone 
to Terrace Falls in the form of a kickback would not be made known to Margetts. There 
was no reason for him to expect anything from Terrace Falls. The Twenty Percent 
Agreement was totally valueless if the credit to Margetts under the Agreement was to come 
from Terrace Falls, the partnership which owned the project prior to its conveyance to 
American. It would not be selling any condominium units nor would it receive anything from 
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the sale of condominium units. If that were the purpose of the Twenty Percent Agreement 
it would be totally illusory and Margetts surely would not have released his lien and signed 
the other agreements in return for such an illusory expectation. Nor would American expect 
him to do so, knowing of his refusal for two months to accept what they had already 
proposed. In other words, it was totally unreasonable for both parties to interpret the 
Twenty Percent Agreement to give Margetts a percentage of what Terrace Falls might get 
in the future, which every body knew would be nothing. Margetts would not give up his 
bargaining position for nothing and American knew he would not. 
Furthermore, why would the assignment to Margetts be limited to $134,283.00, 
the price to be paid by Margetts under the Condominium Purchase Agreement with 
American [Exh. 7], if that agreement was not part of the whole transaction with American. 
There would be no reason to limit his participation with Terrace Falls to that figure since 
Terrace Falls owed Margetts over $300,000.00 [Exh. 2, If 2(a) and (b)]. 
Therefore, the only interpretation of the Twenty Percent Agreement that makes 
any sense is that it was American who was agreeing to credit Margetts, up to $134,283.00, 
the stated purchase price of his unit, for 20% of "any proceeds from the sale of the Project 
or of any unit or interest therein" [Exh. 10 and 16]. For this reason Margetts' testimony as 
to what Snow told him about the agreement is entirely credible and the only version of the 
conversation that is credible: 
Q. After Mr. Snow had presented you with the 20-Percent 
Agreement, Exhibit 16, did he say anything to you? 
A. Yes. He said, "Do you realize that they only have to sell 
seven condominiums and your condominium will be paid for?" 
Q Did you make any response to that? 
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A. He made an explanation that I would get what I wanted by 
such an agreement. 
Q. Did you ask him anything about that agreement, yourself? 
A. Yes. I asked him why American Savings wasn't signing it. 
Q. Did he respond? 
A. Yes. He said, "They didn't need to." He said, "With the 
deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, they will be Terrace Falls 
Condominiums."3 
Q. Now, did you believe what he told you? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. And did you rely on it? 
A. I relied on it. [R. 539, pp. 212-4]. 
That is the only interpretation of this agreement that makes any sense. American took 
advantage of that interpretation when it encouraged Margetts to find buyers of units in the 
project and actually sold five condominiums as a result of that [R. 539, p. 230]. 
Irrespective of whether Snow actually told Margetts that American would be 
Terrace Falls and would be bound by the Twenty Percent Agreement, the fact is that 
American, by the terms of the Real Property Purchase Agreement, did become Terrace Falls 
Condominiums and New West is still operating the project under that name. That Real 
Property Purchase Agreement provides that the "Owner", Terrace Falls Condominiums, 
"shall sell, grant, and convey to American" the real and personal property of the project and 
the business of selling or leasing units, or the ownership or rental of 
condominiums, or in connection with the use thereof, including but 
not limited to: (i) all of Owner's right, title, and interest in the 
Property as Developer/Declarant; (ii) all trade styles or names used 
in connection with the same, including but not limited to, the name 
"Terrace Falls":... (xii) any other rights of Owner . . . in connection 
with the Property; [Exh. 4, H2.B] (emphasis supplied). 
3. It should be noted that this is not the kind of response a layman would make-
up or a concept that a layman would understand. It is the kind of language that would come 
from an attorney. Margetts' version of this conversation is by far more credible than Snow's. 
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Thus, American stepped into the shoes of Terrace Falls and took over the obligation to 
complete the project and to pay the bills incurred in owning, operating and selling the 
project. It inherited the burdens and benefits of the project including the obligation to credit 
Margetts for 20% of the proceeds of sales in the project. American, as the owner and the 
seller of units, was the only party with any ability to perform the Twenty Percent Agreement. 
E, New West is obligated to Margetts as a third party beneficiary 
of the Real Estate Purchase Agreement. 
Even if the Twenty Percent Agreement is considered to have been made by 
Terrace Falls, American, as the purchaser of the project from Terrace Falls, with knowledge 
of the obligation to Margetts through Snow, who informed American of the agreement 
(whether or not he is its agent), is obligated to Margetts as a third party beneficiary of the 
Real Property Purchase and Sale Agreement. Mullins v. Evans, 560 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Utah 
1977). By paragraph 4.E of the Real Estate Purchase Agreement, American agreed to pay 
all sums required of it by the Settlement Agreements, including the agreement with 
Margetts. That Settlement Agreement is between Terrace Falls and Margetts. Since the 
Twenty Percent Agreement is also between Terrace Falls and Margetts and they must be 
construed together as one agreement (See Point II.A above), the Twenty Percent Agreement 
is part of that Settlement Agreement. American has therefore agreed, by paragraph 4.E of 
the Real Estate Purchase Agreement, to pay all amounts due Margetts under the Twenty 
Percent Agreement. Margetts is an intended third party beneficiary of that agre, ment. 
This transaction is similar to a bulk sale in which Terrace Falls sold its inventory 
of condominium units to American. Comparison to the bulk sales law is instructive since the 
purpose of that is to make sure that all outstanding obligations of the seller are paid or 
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provided for in the sale of the assets from which claimants would otherwise be paid. 
American and Terrace Falls did make provision for the payment of such obligations in the 
Real Property Purchase Agreement, as stated above, wherein they agreed to cooperate in 
obtaining the release of liens and American agreed to pay all sums required to be paid in 
connection with the obtaining of such releases. Thus, by its own contract, American agreed 
to pay what was required to obtain a release from Margetts and Margetts is the beneficiary 
of that contract. New West has now stepped into the shoes of American and is likewise 
bound to honor the commitments made to and for the benefit of Margetts. 
POINT III 
MARGETTS WAS INDUCED TO ENTER INTO THE 
AGREEMENTS WITH AMERICAN AND TO RELEASE HIS LIEN 
BY IMPROPER CONDUCT, WHETHER TERMED FRAUD, 
DURESS, COERCION, MISTAKE, NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION, UNCONSCIONABILITY, OR UNFAIR 
DEALING AND IS ENTITLED TO RESCISSION OR DAMAGES. 
If it is determined that the Twenty Percent Agreement is not binding on New 
West, then the facts recited above clearly demonstrate that Margetts was induced to sign the 
agreements and release his lien because of the representations made to him by Snow. He 
would not have done so except for his reliance upon those representations which turned out 
to be false and were known by Snow to have been false. All of the elements of fraud are 
present including false, material representations made knowingly or recklessly, justifiable 
reliance, inducement and damage. Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952). 
The elements of negligent misrepresentation are also present, including pecuniary interest 
in the transaction, superior position to know the facts, careless or negligent false 
representation expecting reliance and reasonable reliance and damage. Christenson v. Com. 
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Land Title Co., 666 P.2d 302 (Utah 1983). Duress and coercion are also present. Reliable 
Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins., 16 U.2d 211, 398 P.2d 685 (Utah 1965). Since 
Margetts perception of the agreement was an essential element of the contract and it is 
unconscionable to enforce the contract against him without honoring what he thought he was 
getting, unilateral mistake also provides grounds for relief. John Call Engineering v. Manti 
City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1987); B & A Associates v. L. A. Young Sons Const. Co., 
796 P.2d 692 (Utah 1990). Because Margetts gave up his entire interest in the project in 
return for what was an illusory promise, the agreement is unconscionable and should be 
rescinded or reformed. Resource Management Co. v. Western Ranch & Livestock Co., Inc., 
706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985); Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 445 (Utah 1983). 
Any one or all of these principles have application in this case and entitle 
Margetts to rescission of the transaction and reinstatement of his lien or, in the alternative, 
to damages for what he has lost as a result. What he has lost is the $200,000.00, plus 
interest, which was secured by his lien on the project. In any event the judgment against him 
in this case cannot be justified in light of the unfair dealing that has occurred in this matter. 
POINT IV 
IF THE CONDOMINIUM PURCHASE AGREEMENT IS NOT 
ENFORCED IN MARGETTS' FAVOR, HE IS ENTITLED TO A 
JUDGMENT FOR THE PAYMENTS MADE OR CREDIT GIVEN 
BASED ON UNCONSCIONABLE FORFEITURE. 
This Court's remand order required the lower court to clarify why boti rfeiture 
and rent were awarded and to explore the "question of whether Margetts forfc d his 
$150,000 credit." Although the lower court recognized some merit in the arguments 
presented by counsel on this point, it failed to make any findings on this issue and felt that 
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this Court was perhaps confused. The crucial nature of this point is apparent when one 
considers that Margetts went into this trial with credit for a $150,000 payment (reduced from 
the $300,000 plus originally owed to him) on a contract to purchase the condominium and 
came out with no condominium and a judgment against him totalling $52,546.00! One must 
ask what in the world he did to suffer a loss of more than $200,000.00! The question of 
unconscionable forfeiture must be dealt with and the lower court refused to do so. 
Instead of concluding that a forfeiture had occurred, the lower court concluded 
that Margetts repudiated the Condominium Purchase Agreement [R. 861, If C.l]. This 
conclusion was not based on any finding of fact and was contrary to all of the facts. Indeed, 
Margetts was attempting to enforce that agreement by asking the Court to order New West 
to convey the condominium to him. His payment under the agreement was represented by 
the $150,000 credit and the credit for twenty percent of the sales proceeds of the other 
condominiums pursuant to the Twenty Percent Agreement. After having determined that 
Margetts was not entitled to the credit under the Twenty Percent Agreement, the lower 
court erred in concluding that Margetts breached or repudiated the Condominium Purchase 
Agreement because New West was not attempting to enforce that agreement. If it had sued 
for breach of the agreement, its remedies would have been specific performance, rescission 
of the agreement or damages for breach. It expressly abandoned any attempt to enforce 
performance when objection was made to evidence as to rental value of the property. New 
West's attorney stated, "We are not seeking $134,000.00. That would amount to specific 
performance" [R. 538, p. 154, lines 12-13], thus electing to forego any claim under the 
purchase agreement and electing to pursue only a claim for occupancy. He confirmed this 
35 
in his closing argument when he said, "the primary relief that we seek is . . . restitution or 
possession of the unit" [R. 539, p. 334, lines 4-6] and "we have elected to merely~to proceed 
merely on a theory of the fair rental value of the property" [R. 539 p. 335, lines 6-8]. New 
West did not seek rescission of the agreement because it would have had to restore Margetts 
to the status quo ante and it did not prove any damages for breach of the agreement. It 
sought only damages for unlawful detainer, which had nothing to do with the purchase 
agreement. No remedies were sought under that agreement. The termination of the 
purchase agreement for failure of Margetts to pay what was due raises the question of an 
unconscionable forfeiture of the $150,000.00 credit. 
There is a long line of cases in the State of Utah which refuses to allow the seller 
of real property, after termination of the sales contract for default by the buyer, to retain 
all amounts received by the seller (including credits to the buyer) if those amounts do not 
bear a reasonable relationship to the seller's actual damages. Unconscionable forfeiture is 
the legal theory behind these cases. Each of these cases compares the total amount 
forfeited by the buyer to the seller's actual damages and determines if there is a reasonable 
relationship between the two. For example, Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1983) held 
that "liquidated damages of $20,725 do not bear a reasonable relationship to $5,895 actual 
damages." The Court ordered the difference of $14,830 returned to the buyer. Allen v. 
Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394 (Utah 1986), held that liquidated damages of $10,800 d not bear 
a reasonable relationship to actual damages of $3,746 and ordered the difference c $7,054 
returned to the buyer. Johnson v. Carmen, 572 P.2d 371 (Utah 1977), held that liq, lated 
damages of $34,596 did not bear a reasonable relationship to actual damages of $25/ 0 and 
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ordered the difference of $8,845 returned to the buyer. Jacobsen v. Swan, 3 U.2d 59, 278 
P.2d 294 (1954), held that liquidated damages of $5,060 did not bear a reasonable 
relationship to actual damages of $1,870 and ordered the difference of $3,190 returned to 
the buyer. Morris v. Svkes, 624 P.2d 681 (Utah 1981), held that liquidated damages of 
$23,216 did not bear a reasonable relationship to actual damages of $9,095 and ordered the 
difference of $14,121 returned to the buyer. More recently, Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1097 
(Utah 1991), held that liquidated damages of $76,190.36 did not bear a reasonable 
relationship to actual damages of $50,132.03 and ordered the difference of $26,058.33 
returned to the buyer. In this case the liquidated damages of New West amount to $159,234, 
consisting of the $150,000 credit for which Margetts gave up his lien and the $9,234 he paid 
to finish his unit. Actual damages are $17,100, consisting of the rental value during Margetts 
occupancy. Based on the standard of the foregoing cases, these are grossly and 
unconscionably disproportionate and the Court should order payment of the difference of 
$142,134 to Margetts. Termination of the contract is an unconscionable forfeiture of that 
contract and New West has taken that condominium from Margetts. Margetts is entitled 
to a return of the excess of what he has paid over and above New West's actual damages. 
The lower court somehow concluded that Margetts was not entitled to judgment 
for forfeiture of the $150,000 credit because American did not receive the $150,000. This, 
of course, was simply a failure to recognize what happened. Margetts had given up his Park 
City condominium which had been valued by the parties at $200,000 and was to receive 
interest thereon at 15% per annum, making over $300,000 at the time of the transaction with 
American. American was willing to give Margetts a credit of $150,000 on the purchase of 
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a condominium in return for the benefits it would receive from the transaction. Those 
benefits were substantial and were worth a great deal more than $150,000. In addition to 
retaining $2,476,000 it still held in its loan to Terrace Falls, it wanted to "avoid [the] negative 
publicity" of a foreclosure that "always puts a negative cloud on the project, makes marketing 
more difficult" because of other "highly visible" projects in the area that had been foreclosed. 
It further wanted "to have a smooth transition, and to all outward appearances, the public 
would not be aware that there were any particular difficulties on the project and it "also 
wanted the quickness and the ease of the deed-in-lieu proceeding". It also wanted to avoid 
a possible "Chapter 11 type bankruptcy" proceeding which could delay foreclosure for 
months and perhaps years. These were all described as "advantages to American." [R. 539, 
p. 41]. In return for these advantages, American was willing to pay cash of over $88,000 
[Exh. 1-5 to Exh.4] and grant credits of $414,000 [Exh. 6 and 7 to Exh. 4] to lienholders, 
including the $150,000 credit to Margetts. To conclude that American did not receive the 
$150,000 from Margetts is totally erroneous. American received substantial value and 
Margetts parted with substantial value which both parties agreed was $159,234, including the 
$9,234 Margetts paid to complete his condominium. To take this away from Margetts and 
to enter a $52,000 judgment against him is unconscionable and is contrary to the law 
established by the foregoing and other cases. Margetts is entitled to have judgment entered 
in his favor in the amount of $142,134. 
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POINT V 
THE JUDGMENT AGAINST MARGETTS FOR THE FAIR 
RENTAL VALUE OF THE UNIT IN THE AMOUNT OF $17,100 
WAS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE OR THE FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND IS CONTRARY TO LAW. 
The lower court entered judgment against Margetts for rent for nineteen months 
based on what the court determined the fair rental value to be. This judgment was obviously 
not based on any rental agreement between Margetts and New West. In fact, the court 
found that no such agreement existed [R. 515, If 16]. The evidence fully supports this since 
Roulhac Garn did not prepare an occupancy agreement for Margetts [R. 539, p. 305] and 
since no one ever asked Margetts to pay any homeowner's fees or rent [R. 539, p. 235] and 
in fact refused his offer to pay homeowners' fees [R. 539, p. 233]. How can the court 
conclude that Margetts owes rent without an agreement to pay rent? There must be a 
factual and legal basis for such a conclusion. 
The only possible legal basis for such a conclusion would be unjust enrichment, 
which requires that (1) a benefit be conferred on one person by another, (2) an appreciation 
or knowledge by the conferee of the benefit, and (3) the acceptance or retention by the 
conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the conferee 
to retain the benefit without payment of its value. Concrete Products Co. v. Salt Lake 
County, 734 P.2d 910 (Utah 1987); Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553 (Utah 1984). There 
was no unjust enrichment in those cases even though a benefit was conferred on one party. 
In our case there are no facts to establish these essential elements. The court actually found 
that both parties benefited from Margetts' occupancy [R. 515, II 16]. American dismissed 
its security personnel because of Margetts' presence on the project and, in addition, several 
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sales of units were made as a direct result of his presence there [R. 515, 1111 18 and 19; R. 
539, p. 230]. That represents a substantial benefit to American which would exceed any 
rental value of the unit and, in light of that, it cannot be concluded that it would be 
inequitable for Margetts to retain any benefit he may have received. The court, of course, 
made no such finding. Furthermore, New West lost no revenue because of Margetts' 
occupancy since only three units in the entire project were rented out [R. 538, p. 151, 161-2]. 
The rest of the complex was essentially vacant. But, most importantly, Margetts lost the 
condominium in which he had a contribution of $159,234, which was turned over to New 
West for nothing. That tremendous benefit to New West must be offset against any benefit 
to Margetts or that loss to Margetts must be offset against any benefit he may have received. 
The net effect is that Margetts received no benefit from the transaction at all. The 
principles of unjust enrichment simply do not exist. Furthermore, Karapanos v. Boardwalk 
Fries, Inc., 837 P.2d 576, 578 (Utah 1992), held that "recovery for quantum meruit 
presupposes that no enforceable written or oral contract exists." The existence of the 
Condominium Purchase Agreement, which New West elected not to enforce, precludes any 
application of unjust enrichment. Accordingly, there is no basis for an award of rent and 
the judgment for rent must be reversed. 
POINT VI 
THE JUDGMENT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER FOR $21,600 
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS NOR THE LAW. 
New West did not comply with the unlawful detainer statute and there is no sis 
for a judgment for unlawful detainer. The basis for the claim of unlawful detainer was the 
Notice to Quit on March 25, 1989. The section of the Unlawful Detainer Statute relied 
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upon by New West as the basis for this claim is §78-36-3, U.C.A. The only provision that 
could apply to this case is §78-36-3 (l)(b)(ii) which provides: 
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of 
an unlawful detainer 
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite term with 
monthly or other periodic rent reserved: 
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in 
possession of the premises after the expiration of a notice of not less 
than five days; 
To come within this provision the tenant must have leased the property "for an indefinite 
term with monthly or other periodic rent reserved." The next subparagraph does not apply 
unless the property is leased with periodic rent reserved and then the tenancy is converted 
to a tenancy-at-will. Since the clause having to do with tenancies at will is a subdivision of 
subparagraph (b), there must have been a lease of the property "for an indefinite time with 
monthly or other periodic rent reserved" before the subdivision on tenancies at will applies. 
Otherwise, that subdivision would have been listed by itself as subparagraph (c), or some 
other letter designation. This does not leave New West without a remedy since it always had 
the non-summary remedies that existed at common law prior to and after the adoption of 
the Unlawful Detainer Statute. American Holding Co., 23 U.2d 432, 464 P.2d 592 (Utah 
1970), at 593-5 (concurring opinion). In this case there was no lease and no rent of any kind 
reserved. There was simply no basis for unlawful detainer. 
As stated in Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (Utah 1952), 
"unlawful detainer, being a summary procedure, the statute must be strictly complied with 
in order to enforce the obligations imposed by it." New West has not complied with the 
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requirements of §78-36-3 in order to place Margetts in unlawful detainer of the 
condominium unit. Furthermore, it has not complied with §78-36-6 which provides: 
The notices required by the preceding sections may be served: 
(1) by delivering a copy to the tenant personally; 
(2) by sending a copy through registered or certified mail 
addressed to the tenant at his place of residence; 
(3) If he is absent from his place of residence or from his usual 
place of business, by leaving a copy with a person of suitable age and 
discretion at either place and mailing a copy to the tenant at the 
address of his place of residence or place of business; or 
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found at 
the place of residence, then by affixing a copy in a conspicuous place 
on the leased property. 
The evidence in this case was that the Notice to Quit was mailed to Margetts [R. 538, pp. 
177-8] but there was no evidence that it was sent by registered or certified mail as required 
by the statute. Strict compliance with that statute is the essence of an unlawful detainer 
action and the burden is on New West to prove that it has fully complied. That applies to 
the form of the notice, American Holding Co. v. Hanson, supra, as well as to the service of 
the notice, Carstensen v. Hansen, 107 Utah 234, 152 P.2d 954 (Utah 1944). In Carstensen, 
the mailing of a notice to quit was held to be insufficient because it did not comply with the 
statute. The court stated, at 955: 
There could be no need to detail certain explicit methods of service 
if any method will do. . . . "Under statutes like this, it is not the fact 
that the party to be notified has actual knowledge of the fact, but it 
is proof that it has been conveyed to him in the prescribed method, 
that gives right of action. . . . The statutory method, once broken 
through, would open wide the gates for vicious precedents, which 
rapidly multiply, and too often, in the end, practically nullify the will 
of the legislature." [quoting Hyde v. Goldsby, 25 Mo. App. 29] 
Since the decision in that case, the statute has been amended to allow **vice 
of the notice by registered or certified mail, §78-36-6(2), U.C.A., but not by reguL mail. 
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New West has not met its burden of proof to show that it is entitled to proceed under the 
Unlawful Detainer Statute. Service by regular mail and actual notice by any method, other 
than those prescribed by the statute, is simply not sufficient to place one in unlawful 
detainer. Other remedies were available to New West to obtain possession of the property 
without the necessity of following the strict requirements of the Unlawful Detainer Statute, 
but if it wants the benefits of the summary procedure, it must follow the steps outlined 
therein. American Holding Co., supra at 593-5 (concurring opinion). 
Likewise, New West's failure to serve Mrs. Margetts with a notice to quit is fatal 
to its claim for damages for unlawful detainer. The statute requires that the notice be 
served in one of the four ways listed in §78-36-6, U.C.A. Mrs. Margetts was not served with 
a notice at all, let alone in one of the ways prescribed by the statute. This same situation 
arose in Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446, 449 (1952), in which the wife was 
served but the husband was not. The court held: 
Unlawful detainer, being a summary procedure, the statute must be 
strictly complied with in order to enforce the obligations imposed by 
it. The trial court correctly ruled that the action for unlawful 
detainer could not be maintained against Mr. Perkins. . . . 
. . . . So long as he remained in possession, it is difficult to see how 
the Spencers could be damaged by the fact that Mrs. Perkins 
remained there. Even if she had moved, Spencers would have had 
no right to possession of the premises as against Mr. Perkins. They, 
therefore, suffered no actual damage. In Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 
137, 292 P. 206, 211, we held that "The damages which may be 
recovered in an action such as this one (unlawful detainer) are 
measured by the rule that they must be the natural and proximate 
consequences of the acts complained of and nothing more." Nominal 
damages to vindicate their right to possession against her is all that 
could properly by awarded. 
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The court in Perkins came to this conclusion even though Mr. Perkins was working in 
another county and may not have been actually residing in the home at the time of service 
on Mrs. Perkins. Because there was no proof that he had abandoned the home or that the 
marriage was not intact, it was presumed that Mr. Perkins was occupying the home. The 
Margetts case is, therefore, a stronger one for holding that no more than nominal damages 
could be recovered. Furthermore, even if Mrs. Margetts had been properly served with the 
notice, she was not joined as a party to the action. No judgment could be effective against 
her. New West has suffered no damages as a result of Margetts' occupancy of the property. 
The severe remedy of the unlawful detainer statute requires strict compliance 
with all of its terms before judgment thereunder is appropriate. American Holding Co. v. 
Hanson, supra: Van Zwerden v. Farrar, 15 U.2d 367, 393 P.2d 468 (1964). New West was 
simply not in a position to sue under the Unlawful Detainer Statute. 
POINT VII 
THE JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES IS NOT BASED 
ON ANY STATUTE, AGREEMENT NOR EVIDENCE. 
Any award of attorney's fees must be based on either a statute or an 
agreement which authorizes such fees. Not even a stipulation will support such an award. 
Mecham v. Benson, 590 P.2d 304 (Utah 1979). The only statute involved in this case is the 
Unlawful Detainer Statute which provides, in §78-36-10(3), U.C.A., for the award of 
attorney's fees only "if they are provided for in the lease or agreement." "he "lease or 
agreement" is defined under §78-36-10(1) as "the lease or agreement und 'hich the 
property was held. New West's own attorney admitted that she prepared nc jcupancy 
agreement [R. 539, p. 305]. 
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The Condominium Purchase Agreement does not provide for fees in this case. 
In the first place that agreement only provides for fees in a dispute arising "under this 
Agreement," which is not the agreement under which Margetts held the property. In the 
second place, New West did not obtain a judgment based on a claim or dispute under that 
agreement. In fact, it abandoned its claim under that agreement when it sought a judgment 
only for Margetts' occupancy of the property. When objection was made to evidence as to 
rental value because of the claim to enforce the agreement, New West's attorney stated, "We 
are not seeking $134,000.00. That would amount to specific performance" [R. 538, p. 154], 
thus electing to forego the claim under the purchase agreement and electing to pursue only 
a claim for occupancy. He confirmed this in his closing argument when he said, "the primary 
relief that we seek is . . . restitution or possession of the unit" [R. 539, p. 334] and "we have 
elected to merely-to proceed merely on a theory of the fair rental value of the property" 
[R. 539, p. 335]. Consistent with that position, the lower court only awarded judgment based 
on Margetts' occupancy of the property. 
Utah cases have held that one may not "avoid the contract and, at the same time, 
claim the benefit of the provision for attorney's fees." BLT Investment Co. v. Snow, 586 
P.2d 456, 458 (Utah 1978). The abandonment of the claim under the agreement is an 
avoidance of the agreement. Similarly, Cluff v. Culmer. 556 P.2d 498, 499 (Utah 1976), held: 
However, this court has numerous times said that such a provision 
for attorney's fees makes them allowable only for enforcement of the 
covenants in the contract. Therefore, it does not extend to implied 
covenants or obligations not expressly included therein. It follows 
that the trial court correctly ruled that attorney's fees claimed by the 
plaintiffs are not allowable. 
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See also Grahn v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 320, 329 (Utah App. 1990) (fees cannot be awarded 
under a contract when the dispute does not relate to a breach or dispute under the 
contract). Since New West was not enforcing any covenant in the purchase agreement, it 
cannot rely on the attorney's fee provision of that agreement. There is, therefore, no basis 
for the award of attorney's fees. 
Furthermore, Cluff v. Oilmen supra at 499, went on to state: 
When attorney's fees are properly awardable, they must be proved 
as any other damages; either by stipulation that the court may 
determine them from his own knowledge and experience, or there 
must be evidence upon which to base a finding as to their necessity 
and reasonableness. 
There is neither a stipulation nor evidence in this case from which a finding of necessity and 
reasonableness can be made. That is a further ground upon which the award of attorney's 
fees must be overturned. 
Most importantly, the dispute in this case is not under the Condominium 
Purchase Agreement but is under the total agreement, including the Twenty Percent 
Agreement. In fact, since New West claims it is not bound by the Twenty Percent 
Agreement, the entire dispute is really over whether or not the Twenty Percent Agreement 
applies. It would, therefore, be totally inconsistent to hold that the Twenty Percent 
Agreement does not apply and then award attorney's fees under a separate agreement that 
is not in dispute. Conversely, if fees are to be awarded under the Condominium Purchase 
Agreement, because there is a dispute under that agreement, then the Twenty Percent 
Agreement must be a part of that agreement since that is the basis of the entire dispute. 
It would follow that Margetts must prevail on his claim that all of the documents must be 
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read together as one agreement binding on American, and the award of attorney's fees must 
be made to Margetts. That, of course, is what the court ought to order in this case but, 
short of that, a judgment for attorney's fees in favor of New West cannot stand. 
POINT VIII 
THE AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST WAS 
CONTRARY TO LAW SINCE THE DAMAGES COULD NOT BE 
CALCULATED PRECISELY AND WERE FOR THE TRIER-OF-
FACT TO DETERMINE. 
Prejudgment interest is allowable, according to Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, 
Brown and Gunnell 784 P.2d 475, at 483 (Utah App. 1989), only when the damages can be 
calculated with mathematical certainty 
in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known standards of 
value, which the court or jury must follow in fixing the amount, 
rather than be guided by their best judgment . . . . 
On the other hand, interest cannot be allowed in cases 'where 
damages are incomplete and are peculiarly within the province of the 
jury to assess at the time of trial' . . . . In particular, damages 
ascertained by determining the fair market value of real property 
before and after the damage 'cannot be determined with 
mathematical precision [and] may be inherently uncertain.' 
The determination of rental value of real property is in the same category since that is in 
the province of the trier-of-fact to be determined from the testimony of experts. Therefore, 
as in Price-Orem, prejudgment interest cannot be awarded. This principle was reaffirmed 
in Shoreline Development, Inc. v. Utah County. 835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah App. 1992) which 
also held that prejudgment interest could not be awarded in a case for the equitable relief 
of unjust enrichment, which could be the only legal basis for the award of rent in this case. 
Likewise, the addition of prejudgment interest on the entire judgment amount included in 
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the new judgment entered January 11, 1993, was in error. Like rental value, treble damages 
for unlawful detainer and attorney's fees are not subject to calculation in advance by 
mathematical certainty and cannot support prejudgment interest. That portion of the 
judgment, too, must be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
This dispute is over the entire agreement between the parties, which includes the 
Twenty Percent Agreement. All of the documents must be upheld, or rescinded, together 
and Margetts' lien be reinstated or he be given credit against the price of his unit for twenty 
percent of the proceeds of sales of other units. Margetts is on one side of the transaction 
and New West and Terrace Falls stand together on the other side, each bound by the other's 
promises, both having received and accepted the benefits of Margetts' agreement. 
The inconsistencies and ambiguities among those documents allow the 
consideration of extrinsic evidence to interpret them and require that the entire agreement 
be held unenforceable unless Margetts' view of those documents, as represented to him by 
Snow, be adopted. That is the only view that makes any sense under the circumstances. 
Snow was authorized directly by American to negotiate for a release from 
Margetts. American gave Snow directions, accepted advice from him, instructed him to draft 
the documents, authorized him to negotiate for it and paid his fees for all of this. Snow, 
therefore, had actual authority and American is bound by all his acts and representations 
within the course of that employment even if it did not authorize all of the specific *ts. 
Furthermore, by placing Snow in a position to speak for it and making all communicati is 
to Margetts through Snow, American clothed Snow with apparent authority to act for and 
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bind it and Margetts was justified in relying on the statements made by Snow. Furthermore, 
American, and New West, had no qualms about accepting the benefits of the agreement 
with Margetts. It received and kept what it set out to obtain from Margetts with no concern 
that Margetts didn't receive what he was promised in return. That constitutes ratification 
and estops it from denying Margetts the benefit he was to receive. 
New West has received from Terrace Falls a conveyance of the whole project, 
including the name "Terrace Falls" and the business of selling of condominium units. 
Terrace Falls is left with nothing (except a release of liability) and New West has everything. 
As the successor-in-interest to Terrace Falls, New West became Terrace Falls and still 
operates as Terrace Falls Condominiums. It is, therefore, responsible for its obligations, 
especially those incurred in obtaining the releases required to complete the transfer. 
The facts of this case constitute fraud, duress, mistake, negligent 
misrepresentation, unconscionability and unfair dealing which entitle Margetts to rescission 
and return to the status quo ante or to damages for the loss to him. 
The awarding of the condominium to New West and the loss of Margetts' 
payments of $159,234 constitute an unconscionable forfeiture. The least that Margetts is 
entitled to is a judgment of $142,134 as the difference between the amount forfeited by 
Margetts and the actual damages suffered by New West. 
There was no occupancy agreement upon which the court could base its award 
of rental value and the essential elements of unjust enrichment were not pleaded nor 
proved. In particular, New West has failed to show that it was inequitable for Margetts to 
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retain the benefit of occupancy of the condominium, while New West retained the 
condominium that Margetts had paid for and did not receive. 
Instead of pursuing one of the normal remedies available to it to obtain 
possession of the condominium, New West attempted to utilize the summary procedures of 
the Unlawful Detainer Statute but without complying with the strict requirements of that 
statute. An award of damages under that statute is, therefore, improper. 
A judgment for attorney's fees in favor of New West is also improper because 
there is no statute or contract which authorizes such an award and there was no evidence 
before the court upon which an award of fees could be based. The only possible justification 
for an award of attorney's fees would require the court to hold that the Twenty Percent 
Agreement, the subject of the dispute in this case, was a part of the Condominium Purchase 
Agreement which authorizes an award of fees and, therefore, Margetts' view of the whole 
agreement would be adopted and judgment must be entered in his favor on the merits as 
well as to attorney's fees. 
Judgment should be entered in favor of Margetts rescinding the transaction and 
reinstating his lien or awarding him ownership of the condominium, and his costs and fees. 
In the alternative, a judgment should be awarded to Margetts in the amount of $142,134 for 
the unconscionable forfeiture. In any event, the judgment in favor of New West can not be 
justified and must be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACprtPZUa^ & MARSH 
Ralph J. Mafrsh 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision, dated February 20, 1992. 
2. Portions of Exhibit 4: Real Property Purchase and Sale Agreement, dated November 19, 
1984. 
3. Exhibit 7: Condominium Purchase Agreement, dated November 14, 1984. 
4. Exhibit 10: Twenty Percent Agreement, dated November 14, 1984. 
5. Exhibit 16: Twenty Percent Agreement, dated November 14, 1984. 
6. Utah Code Annotated: 
§ 78-36-3 Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than life. 
§ 78-36-6 Notice to quit - How served. 
§ 78-36-10 Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
New West Federal Savings and 
Loan Association, successor-in-
interest to American Savings 
and Loan Association, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
John L. Margetts, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
Attorneys: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 900409-CA 
F I L E D 
( F e b r u a r y 2 PiTho 
'0Mj 
Mary T. ?Joonan 
Cterk of tho Court 
R a l p h J . Marsh , S a l t Lake C i t y , f o r AppelJS^rifctmufApfnrate 
W. C u l l e n B a t t l e and C r a i g T. J a c o b s e n , S a l t Lake 
C i t y f o r A p p e l l e e 
rt»«4tt/*—^ 
Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Jackson. 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
John L. Margetts appeals from a judgment against him for 
breach of contract and unlawful detainer. Margetts claims that 
American Savings and Loan Association (American), predecessor-in-
interest to New West Federal Savings and Loan, was also in breach 
of contract for failure to give him twenty percent of the sale 
proceeds from five units he helped sell in Terrace Falls 
Condominiums. In the alternative, Margetts requests rescission 
of his agreement with American to buy a unit in Terrace Falls on 
the grounds of fraud and other defenses to the formation of a 
contract. Margetts also seeks disqualification of the law firm 
of Fabian & Clendenin for a conflict of interest. 
The trial court denied Margetts's motion to disqualify and 
found, in relevant part, as to the other issues raised by these 
facts that 
9. The Agreement, dated November 14, 1984 
between Margetts and Terrace Falls, which has 
been referred to by the parties as the "20% 
Agreement" . . . was executed by Margetts and 
Terrace Falls only. 
0C543 
10• American Savings did not agree to 
perform any obligations under the 2 0% 
Agreement. 
11. American Savings did not otherwise agree 
to assume any obligations of Terrace Falls or 
its principals to Margetts. 
12. No fraud was committed by American 
Savings, or its agents or attorneys, in 
connection with the negotiation and execution 
of the Purchase Agreement, the Settlement 
Agreement, the 2 0% Agreement or the other 
documents referred to above. 
13. Even if Gerald Snow, who was Terrace 
Falls' attorney, had made material 
misrepresentations of fact to Margetts in 
connection with the execution of those 
documents, any reliance by Margetts upon 
those misrepresentations would have been 
unreasonable because: 
(a) Margetts recognized that the 
20% Agreement was inconsistent with 
Snow's alleged representations; 
(b) Margetts was represented by an 
attorney in the transaction, but he 
did not consult with that attorney 
regarding the apparent 
inconsistency between the agreement 
and the alleged representations; 
(c) Margetts did not request that 
the alleged representations be 
memorialized in writing; and 
(d) Margetts never inquired about 
Mr. Snow's authority to bind 
American Savings. 
14. Mr. Snow did not have actual or apparent 
authority to enter into agreements in behalf 
of American Savings, or to modify existing 
agreements. 
Margetts alleges that Snow came to him privately, after 
earlier attempts to reach a settlement had failed, and offered 
him a deal to release his lien. According to Margetts, the deal 
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included a $150,000 credit towards the purchase of a condominium 
unit, and a right to receive twenty percent of the proceeds from 
the sale of other units. Margetts alleges that Snow assured him 
that, after receiving his share of proceeds under the Twenty 
Percent Agreement, his unit would be completely paid for and he 
would recoup any interest losses. Margetts also alleges that 
Snow told him that the documents constituting the lien release 
and condominium purchase agreement would not be delivered until 
American Savings was bound by the Twenty Percent Agreement. 
Margetts claims he released his lien and agreed to buy a unit in 
Terrace Falls Condominiums from American on those conditions. 
Margetts concedes that the Twenty Percent Agreement, on its 
face, is between him and Terrace Falls. He alleges, however, 
that Snow had promised him that there was no need to name 
American as a party to the Agreement since American would become 
Terrace Falls in taking over the project. Margetts also alleges 
that American paid Snow to negotiate a settlement of Margetts's 
claim against the project, and that Snow had actual or apparent 
authority, as American's paid agent, to bind American to the 
Twenty Percent Agreement. New West disputes the existence of an 
agency relationship, and contends that Snow was merely Terrace 
Falls's attorney because American was represented by its own 
counsel. New West also argues that the intent of the Twenty 
Percent Agreement was merely to prevent the Terrace Falls 
partners from receiving a windfall in the sale of the project to 
American. 
DISQUALIFICATION 
Margetts claims that he discussed the trade of his unit in a 
Park City condominium with three attorneys who were then with 
Fabian & Clendenin. Margetts argues that Fabian & Clendenin 
should have, therefore, been disqualified as opposing counsel for 
a conflict of interest. See Utah Code of Professional Conduct 
Rule 1.9. Margetts relies on his own diary entries of the 
discussion, but apparently did not produce them. 
Fabian & Clendenin culled through its files, and found no 
record of the discussion. The law firm also represented that 
none of the attorneys alleged to have been involved were still 
employed with the firm. However, no statements of the attorneys 
named were obtained by either Fabian & Clendenin or Margetts. 
The proponent of disqualification for a purported conflict 
of interest bears the burden of proving the existence of an 
attorney-client relationship. Cf. Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. 
Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 727-28 (Utah App. 1990)(in an action for 
legal malpractice, the threshold question is whether an attorney-
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client relationship was established). Margetts simply failed to 
sustain the necessary burden of proof concerning the legal 
consultation claimed. We, therefore, affirm the trial court's 
ruling denying the motion. 
AGENCY 
Margetts claims that American Savings is bound to the Twenty 
Percent Agreement by Snow's conduct under agency principles. 
Inasmuch as the question of whether an agency relationship 
existed between American and Snow puts facts in dispute, see 
Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins., Co., 749 P.2d 
651, 654 (Utah 1988), Margetts is required to marshal the 
evidence in order to show that the findings of the trial court 
were clearly erroneous. 
The marshaling requirement, however, implies the existence 
of adequate findings. In this case, the trial court merely 
concluded, without further elaboration, that Snow had no actual 
or apparent authority to enter into or modify existing agreements 
on behalf of American. In Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 
1987), the Utah Supreme Court said "findings ^should be 
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached./,f £d. at 999 (quoting Rucker v. 
Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979)). The supreme court also 
held in Acton that a trial court's "findings of fact must show 
that the court's judgment or decree xfollows logically from, and 
is supported by, the evidence.'" Id. (quoting Smith v. Smith, 
726 P.423, 426 (Utah 1986)). 
Because the trial court did not enter subsidiary findings to 
reveal the steps by which its factual conclusion was reached, and 
the facts of this case as they appear in the record are not 
"clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding 
in favor of the judgment," Kinkella v. Baugh. 660 P.2d 233, 236 
(Utah 1983), we remand the agency issue for entry of proper 
subsidiary findings of fact and conclusions of law. See \cton, 
737 P.2d at 999. Recognizing that a previous decision of he 
trial court may be altered on remand for additional findii s, see 
Adams v. Board of Review of the Indus. Comm'n, 173 Utah Ad\ Rep. 
18, 22 (Utah App. 1991)(full articulation of facts and law ly 
cause fact finder to reach different conclusion), "[w]e do >t 
intend our remand to be merely an exercise in bolstering anu 
supporting the conclusion already reached." Allred v. Allred, 
797 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah App. 1990). 
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FRAUD 
Since the reasonableness of Margetts's reliance on the 
representations of Snow was expressly contingent on the lack of 
agency, we necessarily remand the issue of fraud. Although the 
trial court's findings on the issue of fraud were more detailed 
than the issue of agency, they also lack subsidiary findings on 
what was said by Snow to Margetts. Margetts asserts that Snow 
indicated it would be unnecessary to name American as party to 
the Twenty Percent Agreement because American would, in effect, 
become Terrace Falls as a result of the takeover. What Snow said 
is, therefore, critical to a review of the trial court's findings 
as to the reasonableness of Margetts's reliance. 
Inasmuch as remanding the issues of agency and fraud may 
affect the determination of who is at fault for failure to close 
the sale, as well as the question of whether Margetts forfeited 
his $150,000 credit, we also remand the issue of remedies. In 
the event that the trial court again awards a similar combination 
of remedies, the trial court should clarify in its ruling why 
both forfeiture and rent are being awarded. 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the ruling of the trial court denying the motion 
to disqualify because Margetts did not satisfy his burden of 
proof at trial. However, we reverse on the issue of Snow's 
agency since the trial court did not make sufficient findings for 
us to review. We, therefore, remand this case to the trial court 
for additional findings, both as to the issues of agency and 
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fraud, with leave to conduct such further proceeding 
trial court may deem appropriate. s as the 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT 
Norman 
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THIS AGREEMENT is made A/Of0t«-v4r~ w , 1984 by and 
between AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a California 
corporation, formerly known as STATE SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, a California corporation ("American"), and 
HAROLD K. BEECHER and MARGARET BEECHER, husband and wife and 
IRVIN WELLS STEVENS, JR. and DOROTHY A. STEVENS, husband and 
wife ("Borrowers"), J. RON STACEY ("Guarantor") and TERRACE 
FALLS CONDOMINIUMS, a Utah limited partnership ("Owner") . 
1. Recitals. This Agreement is entered into with 
respect to the following facts and circumstances: 
A. Owner is the owner of the property described in 
Exhibit "A" of this Agreement and commonly known as Terrace 
Falls Condominiums located between 3rd and 4th Avenues west 
of "A" Street in the City and County of Salt Lake, State of 
Utah, including any and all improvements on or to such 
property (the "Property"). 
B. American is the beneficiary under and holds a trust 
deed on the Property in favor of Utah Title and Abstract 
Company as Trustee, dated December 22, 1981, and recorded 
December 22, 1981, in Book 5325, Page 625, as Entry No. 
3633978, of Official Records of Salt Lake County (the "Trust 
Deed"). The Trust Deed secures a Promissory Note ("Note") 
made by Borrowers in the original principal amount of 
tf/fl/11** 
(TERUTA/01) 1 . 
SIXTEEN MILLION AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($16,000,000.00), dated 
December 22, 1981, The Note was modified by agreement dated 
June 5, 1984. Borrower's obligations under the Note as 
modified are guaranteed by the personal guarantee of 
Guarantor, dated December 22, 1981 (the "Guarantee"). Owner 
acquired the Property from Borrowers subject to the Trust 
Deed and Note in favor of American and subject to the 
continuing guarantee of Guarantor. Borrowers, Owner and 
Guarantor acknowledge that payment of principal and interest 
required under the Note is now in default. 
C. Common areas and shell construction plus three 
units (nos. 308, 502 and 509) of the Property are 100% 
complete and a certificate of occupancy has been issured for 
this part of the work. Finish allowance work for the 
remaining 77 units is 0 percent complete and certificates of 
occupancy must be individually issued with respect to the 
units as they are completed. 
D. As of October 19, 1984, the principal balance 
outstanding on the Note is $16,000,000.00 with an 
undisbursed L.I.P. balance of $2,476,686.00 (including an 
interest reserve of $394,959.00), accrued interest of 
$806,192.00 with per diem interest at the rate of $6,665.00. 
E. The following creditors ("Creditors") possess 
claims against Owner, Borrowers and/or the Property, as 
follows: 
(TERUTA/01) 2. 
Creditor Claim 
Franklin Capital 
(Ed Scott, Allie Gaupp) 
Adrian L. Giles 
Garth W. Allred 
Paul Buehner 
Bud Bailey Const. Co. and 
Bud Bailey Const. Co. Property 
Sharing Trust 
First Security Financial 
John L. Margetts 
Warrant v. Edward D. Scott 
Judgment v. Eddie F. Scott 
Judgment v. Eddie Forrell 
Scott 
J. Ron Stacey Const. Co, 
$531,160.11 plus interest 
$ 60,000.00 plus interest 
$ 70,000.00 plus interest 
$100,821.00 plus interest 
$ 15,000.00 plus interest 
$118,925.21 plus interest 
(less a payment of 
$49,724.45) 
$200,000.00 credit plus 
interest 
$ 286.25 
$ 1,236.37 
$ 541.00 
General Contractor 
F. Borrowers, Owner and Guarantor are unable to 
discharge and pay the Note to American and the claims of the 
Creditors and they have requested that American accept all 
Borrowers' and Owner's right, title and interest in and to 
the Property in consideration of American's release of 
Borrower, Owner and Guarantor from their obligations under 
the Note and that American compromise the Creditors' claims 
and obtain a termination and release of the general 
construction contract from J. Ron Stacey Construction Co. 
fTFPTTTA/O'n 3 . 
2. Sale of the Property. For the consideration and 
on the terms, provisions, and conditions set forth in this 
Agreement, Owner shall sell, grant, and convey to American 
or to American's nominee, and American shall purchase from 
Owner, the Property, together with the following: 
A. Personal Property. All tangible personal 
property owned by Owner or Borrowers ("Personal Property") 
now existing or on the closing date placed or installed on 
or about the Property, and all of Owner's interest as lessee 
under any leases of such Personal Property. The Personal 
Property is inventoried and listed on Exhibit f,B" attached 
hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. 
B. Intangible Property. All intangible property 
("Intangible Property") now or on the closing date owned or 
held by Owner or Borrowers in connection with the Property, 
the Personal Property, the business of selling or leasing 
units, or the ownership or rental of condominiums, or in 
connection with the use thereof, including but not limited 
to: (i) all of Owner's right, title, and interest in the 
Property as Developer/ Declarant; (ii) all trade styles or 
names used in connection with the same, including but not 
limited to, the name "Terrace Falls"; (iii) all 01 ginal 
plans and survey maps as recorded and required t. be 
recorded under the Utah Condominium Ownership Act, .nd 
conditions of approval, covenants, conditions, mu. 
restrictions as recorded or proposed by the Condomi: ^ um 
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Ownership Act, the Planning Commission and City Council of 
Salt Lake City and other governmental agencies having 
control over the Property; (iv) all recorded declarations, 
filed articles of incorporation and bylaws executed and 
certified by homeowners1 association secretary or Owner that 
the same conform to the requirement of the Condominium 
Ownership Act; (v) all booklets, manuals, and advertising 
material; (vi) all of Owner's right, title and interest in 
and to any "Initial Capital Contributions" or other payments 
to any owners' association of the Property; (vii) all 
architectural, engineering and construction contracts, 
plans, specifications, drawings, studies, reports and 
surveys, including available information on soils, geology, 
archaelogy, natural hazard, solar energy or other feature of 
the project; common area completion bonds; insulation data 
(material thickness R-value) as required by the Federal 
Trade Commission to be disclosed to new home buyers; 
(viii) all of the contents of the tract map files held by 
the County of Salt Lake in connection with the Property; 
(ix) all rights of Owner derived pursuant to all fees paid, 
deposits or bonds posted, including utility deposits, and 
agreements made in connection with the processing of the 
development of the Property; (x) all of Owner's rights under 
any conditional use permits or variances and under all 
building permits and other "Permits" (as described in this 
i 
Agreement); (xi) approved assignment of all fire, hazard, 
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general liability and all other insurance coverage on the 
Property; (xii) any other rights of Owner or its predecessor 
in interest in connection with the Property; (xiii) any 
negative declaration, categorical exemption or other 
appropriate evidence of compliance with a State 
Environmental Quality Act; and (xiv) all Owner's rights, 
claims and causes of action and warranties from and against 
the general contractor and all other persons, firms or 
entities supplying labor, or materials for construction of 
improvements on the Property including, without limitation, 
claims for breach of contract or warranty and (xv) all items 
set forth in Exhibit ffC" attached hereto relating to the 
organization, management and operation of the Property as a 
condominium project. 
3. Release of Claims. Borrowers, Owner, Guarantor 
and American will cooperate to obtain general releases and 
releases of trust deeds, cancellation of promissory notes 
(as applicable) and releases of all the Creditors1 claims 
pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreements attached 
hereto as Exhibits D-l through D-7; and deliver such 
releases into escrow. The Closing hereunder is specifically 
contingent upon the execution and delivery of the fo agoing 
general releases, recordable releases, and all ther 
documents required to be executed and delivered b} the 
Creditors under said Settlement Agreements in order to 
(TERUTA/01) 6. 
insure that title to the Property and Owner1s ability to 
transfer the same to American is free from doubt. 
4. Consideration. 
A. Taxes. For and in consideration of the 
transfer.to it of all right, title and interest of Owner, 
Borrowers and Guarantor in the Property, Personal Property 
and intangibles, American agrees to pay the real property 
taxes for 1984 now due against the Property. 
B. Construction. American* agrees to disburse 
funds without retainage, due to the general contractor and 
subcontractors, laborers and suppliers for work** performed /T^jJj/rfCi 
on the Property/-ewad—approyod^-arra^ accepted—fey—American1^— /T7\xD 
d<& Coftyfe ruction—SuporviGion—Department-, and to pay over all 
retainages held to date on account of construction gn the 
Property. 
C. Release of Borrowers, Owner and Guarantor. 
Subject to the continuing representations and warranties set 
forth in this Agreement, American agrees to release and 
forever discharge Borrowers, Owner and Guarantor from 
liability under the Note, Trust Deed or Guarantee and 
American's Loan No. 021-100312 and to cause the Trust Deed 
to be released as satified and the Note to be cancelled and 
redelivered. 
D. Acceptance of the Property. Subject to the 
continuing representations and warranties set forth herein, 
9<r 
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American accepts the Property "as is", in its existing state 
of partial completion. 
E. Payment of Creditors. American agrees to pay 
all sums and deliver all documents as required of it by the 
Settlement Agreements, Exhibits D-l through D-7, and to pay 
owner's attorney's fees in the amount set forth on 
Exhibit D-8 
5. Representations and Warranties of Borrower. In 
addition to the representations and warranties contained in 
other Paragraphs of this Agreement, Borrower hereby makes ^J?Csy^i 
the representations and warranties in this Paragraph each of *V//^ > 
which individual representation and warranty is (i) material 
and being relied upon by American, and (ii)/true in all iiOi 
respects as of the date of this Agreement and shall be true 
in all respects on the closing date, -fee—the—fees*-—of—' p^tp fyfc 
-Bcrrowor' o—knowledge* »>. All representations and warranties CZ^\P 
shall survive the closing regardless of any investigations fA*™ 
American shall have made with respect to such representa-
tions and warranties prior to the closing. 
A. Condominiumization. The Property is zoned, 
all governmental approvals have been obtained, and all 
actions have been taken as required by the Condominium 
Ownership Act to permit the sale of condominiums other than 
the approval by the Salt Lake City Council of the 
Declaration of Condominium and Condominium Map and the 
recording thereof. There is no pla~., study or effort by any 
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(f) Consents of general and limited 
partners to this transaction by their signature of this 
Agreement; 
(g) Opinion of Owner's counsel that 
this transaction is fully binding against Owner, Borrowers 
and Guarantor; 
(h) A release executed by J. Ron Stacey 
Construction terminating the general construction contract 
and Letter Agreement dated March 18, 1982, and releasing 
Owner, Borrowers, Guarantor and American from further 
liability thereunder in the form attached as Exhibit G; 
(i) Releases of American by Owner, 
Borrowers and Guarantor in the form attached as Exhibits H-l 
and H-2; 
(j) Release by American of Owner, 
Borrowers and Guarantor, by reconveyance of Trust Deed and 
cancellation of Note, as set forth in Paragraph 4.C. , above; 
(k) Payment by American of all sums and yiu -
¥•. 8. *~^ C/ 
delivery of all documents set forth in Paragraphs. 4.E., ijyfe 
above. 
7. Possession. Possession of the Property shall be 
delivered to American upon close of escrow free and clear of 
all tenancies, licenses or other rights of possession or use 
other than those referred to in Exhibits D-6 and D-7. 
8. Owner1s Affirmation: Owner hereby affirms and ac-
knowledges the following: 
» 
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A. Absolute Conveyance. The conveyance of the 
Property to American pursuant to this Agreement is done with 
the concurrence of American, Owner and Borrowers and is 
intended to be and will be an absolute conveyance of the 
title to the Property in full and complete satisfaction of 
Owner's, Borrowers' and Guarantor's liabilities to American 
under the Note, Trust Deed and Guarantees, and is not 
intended as a mortgage, conveyance in trust, or security of 
any kind. Owner and Borrowers warrant and represent they 
are aware of the current value of the Property, the 
Creditor's claims and cost to complete construction and they 
acknowledge that by this transaction they are waiving any 
equity they may have in the Property and are foregoing a 
right of redemption that would exist if American pursued 
foreclosure. 
B. Surrender of Possession. Upon closing, Owner 
will surrender to American possession of the Property in its 
entirety. 
C. Execution of Agreement Made Freely. In execut-
ing this Agreement and all other documents contemplated by 
this Agreement to effect the conveyance of the Property and 
the closing, Owner, Borrowers and Guarantor are not acting 
under any misapprehension, confusion, or doubt as to ~he 
effect thereof, and are acting freely and voluntarily id 
with the advice of counsel and they are under no coercion or 
duress from any source whatsoever. 
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21, Exhibits. All exhibits referred to in this 
Agreement are attached to this Agreement and incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
Approved as to form: 
Ray Quinney & Nebeker 
By: ¥1^^ 
(Gerald Snow, Esq. 
Owner1s Attorney 
Address for Notice: 
Deseret Bldg. 400 
79 So. Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
OWNER: 
TERRACE FALLS CONDOMINIUMS, 
a Utah limited partnership 
By: 
By: 
By: 
Stacey Development, a 
Utah limited^p^r^nership, 
general 
Wells Stevens Enterprises 
a Utah limited partnership, 
general partner 
B y ^ 
t-^ L 
Harold K. Beecher & 
Associates, 
a Utah corporation, 
general partner 
By Tja^^CyL I h /J^/> 
'Its J£AW\^U^Z 
*A^>-
CONSENTED TO ALSO BY THE 
LIMITED PARTNERS OF TERRACE 
FALLS CONDOMINIUMS: 
STACEY DEVELO 
By: 
ILLS STEVENS/ENTERI WELL RPRISES 
By 
Pi^CCuJA^ 
s ^ Harold K. Beecher, 
Individually 
(TERUTA/01) 23 
+ ~ PLAINTIFFS 
| E X T T 1 JUL 3 0198S 
! J CONDOMINIUM PURCHASE AGREEMENT ^L.,t1J'";r 
THIS AGREEMENT .is.made and entered into this . V day 
of November, 1984, by and between AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN* 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah corporation ("Seller"), and JOHN L. MARGETTS, 
an individual ("Buyer"). 
RECITALS: 
A. Seller is the owner of the* Terrace Falls Condominiums 
Project located between 3rd and 4th Avenues west of "A" Street in 
Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Project"). 
B. Buyer desires to acquire from Seller and Seller is 
willing to sell to Buyer a condominium unit in the Project on the 
terms and conditions herein set forth. 
C. This Agreement is entered into pursuant to the terms 
of that cej--t^nSe£tlement Agreement between the parties et al., 
dated OctoBer*?^ ", 1984. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows: 
1. The Unit. Seller does hereby agree to convey to 
Buyer and Buyer does hereby agree to purchase from Seller Unit 
No. 413 in the Project (the "Unit"), as the same is shown and 
described in the Declaration of Condominium and Survey Map"of the 
Project to be recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder's 
Office, a copy of which is attached hereto. The foregoing 
description shall be construed to describe the Unit, together with 
the appurtenant undivided interest in the common areas and 
facilities of the Project -(including one (1) parking space and one 
(1) storage locker), and also to incorporate all the rights 
incident to and limitations on ownership of a condominium unit in 
the Project'-as set forth in said Declaration of Condominium. The 
choice of the foregoing Unit by Buyer shall constitute a final and 
irrevocable selection of a condominium unit in the Project as 
specified in Paragraph 2 of said Settlement Agreement. 
2. Title. Seller shall convey good and market lie title 
to the Unit to Buyer, subject only to the Standard Excep ons and 
Special Exceptions Nos. 2, 3 and 4 set forth in that cert, n title 
insurance commitment issued by Safeco Title Insurance Comj ly 
through Utah Title and Abstract Company, dated October 11, 984, a 
copy of which is attached hereto, as well as to the lien fv ; 
' current year taxes' not- yet due and the Declaration of Condc minium 
and Survey Map of the Project yet to be filed. 
3. Purchase Price. The purchase price of the Unit is 
Two Hundred Ninety-Three Thousand Seventy-Five Dollars 
(V293.075.00), less three percent (3.0%) thereof for the absence 
of a sales commission, for a net price of Two Hundred Eighty-Four 
Thousand Two Hundred Eighty-Three Dollars ($284,283.00). In 
accordance with the Settlement Agreement mentioned in Recital C 
above-v -Buyer is hereby granted a nonrefundable credit'-in the 
amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00) towards 
the purchase price. The balance of the purchase price in the 
amount of One Hundred Thirty-Four Thousand Two Hundred 
Eighty-Three Dollars ($134,283.00) shall be due in full at the 
closing as set forth hereinafter. 
4.—Condition of URJ^H—Buy or hac inspected the >Uait,—u 
which hag been finished to the shell atage with walla aheeLrockea 
and tapod, and io willing to aeeept the construction of the Unit 
to the extent performed to datoi * * ^fllld! 
5. Finish Allowance. The amount of^he/fj.nisn allowance 
with respect to the Unit which is to be spent^ln accordance with 
Buyer's specifications is Sixteen Thousand Eight Hundred 
Thirty-Nine Dollars ($16,839.00). The finish allowance has been 
allotted based on a standard finish package. Buyer may require 
Seller to make reasonable modifications and upgrades to the 
standard finish package, but all such modifications and upgrades 
shall be performed entirely at Buyer's expense to the extent the 
aggregate finish allowance is exceeded. 
6. Possession. Possession of the Unit shall pass to 
Buyer as of the closing date. Seller shall have substantially 
completed the Unit to Buyer's finish specifications prior to the 
closing, provided that Seller shall have a reasonable time after 
the receipt of such specifications or any final change thereto (no 
less than sixty (60) days) in which to complete the Unit. Buyer 
shall provide Seller with Buyer's finish specifications as soon as 
possible, but not later than- March 31, 1985, so that closing can 
take place not later than June 30, 1985. In the event Buyer fails 
to provide Seller with finish specifications by such time, Seller 
shall have the right to proceed to finish the Unit in accordance 
with the standard finish options then being offered to purchasers 
of units in the Project. 
7. Closing. The closing of the purchase and sale of the 
Unit shall take place at the offices of Utah Title and Abstract 
Company, 629 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, at a mutally 
agreeable time, which shall be within fifteen (15) days after 
written notice from Seller to Buyer that the Unit is ready for 
occupancy. Readiness for occupancy shall mean that a certificate 
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of occupancy for ti*e Unit has/been issued by the Salt Lake City 
Building Inspection Division/ At the closing, Seller shall 
deliver to Buyer a Warranty Deed to the Unit and Buyer shall 
deliver to Seller a cashier's check for the balance of the 
purchase price, plus any additional amount due for finish upgrades 
or modifications. Property taxes, insurance and closing fees shall 
be'prorated irrthe usual'fashion as of-the date of-closing.- Also, 
Seller shall furnish to Buyer at Seller's expense'a title 
insurance policy from a reputable title insurance company insuring 
title to the Unit in Buyer in the amount of the purchase price. 
Title to the Unit shall be in the following name(s): 
John L. Margetts and Irma W. tfargetts, Joint Tenants . ^X*? 
8. Default. If the* partti.es fail to close as set forth (A-
herein through the fault of Buyer/ Buyer shall forfeit all rights 
hereunder and shall have no claim against Seller, whether for 
payment of any portion of the credit granted to Buyer against the 
purchase price or for any other thing or amount. If there is a 
delay in closing through the fault of Seller, Buyer shall be 
entitled at his option to enforce this Agreement as written or to 
select another available condominium unit of an equal or greater 
value in place of the Unit, in which case Buyer shall receive a 
credit against the purchase price of such other unit in the same 
amount as the credit provided herein. 
9. Assignment. This Agreement shall be freely 
assignable by either party hereto. 
10. Broker's Fees. Both parties represent and warrant 
that no real estate broker has been involved in this transaction 
and each party agrees to indemnify the other against any claims 
for real estate commissions or finders fees or the like as a 
result of the acts or omissions of such party. 
11. Survival. The parties understand and agree that all 
representations and warranties made herein are true and effective 
both when made and as of the closing, and that all such 
representations and warranties shall survive the closing. 
12. Binding Effect. This Agreement shall inure to the 
benefit of and be binding upon the parties and their respective 
legal representatives, heirs, successors and assigns. 
13. Counterpart Originals. For the convenience of the 
parties, this Agreement shall be executed in two (2) counterpart 
originals, which taken together shall constitute a single 
agreement. 
y
 ""
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14. Notice. Any notice provided for by this Agreement 
shall be in writing and shall be deemed to have been given on the 
date on which such notice is either hand delivered to the party to 
whom such notice is directed or is deposited in the United States 
mail as a certified or registered letter, postage prepaid, return 
receipt requested, pr-operly -addressed to. such party at the address 
specified below: 
If to Seller, at: 
American Savings & Loan Association 
300 North Harrison, 5th Floor 
Stockton, California 95203 
Attn: Real Estate Dept. 
If to Buyer, at: 
John L. Margetts 
2182 Berkeley Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Any such address may be changed by giving notice thereof in 
accordance with the above procedure. 
15. Headings. The headings of the Paragraphs herein 
have been inserted for ease of reference only and shall not 
control or affect the meaning or- interpretation of any of the 
terms and provisions hereof. 
16. Governing Law. This Agreement is entered into under 
and shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah. 
17. Further Action. The parties hereby agree to execute 
and deliver such additional documents and to take such further 
action as may become necessary or desirable to fully carry out the 
provisions and intent of this Agreement. 
18. Prior Agreements. This Agreement supersedes any 
prior understandings or agreements between the parties, whether 
written or verbal, respecting the within subject matter, including 
without limitation the aforesaid Settlement Agreement, and 
contains the entire undersanding of the parties with respect 
thereto. 
19. Force Majeure. Seller shall not be deemed to be in . 
breach hereof because of any nonperformance due to war, riot or 
other civil disturbance, flood, fire, natural disaster, labor 
strike, or other circumstance beyond the reasonable control of 
Seller. ' 
20. Enforcement. In the event of a dispute between the 
parties arising under this Agreement, the party prevailing in such 
dispute shall be entitled to recover such party's costs from the 
other party, including without limitation court costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this 
Agreement on the date hereinabove first written. 
SELLER: 
AMERICAN SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION 
*t y 
BUYER: 
9009s 
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AGREEMENT 
IN CONSIDERATION OF and as further inducement to the 
execution and delivery by John L. Margetts ("Margetts") of a 
Condominium Purchase Agreement, Request for Reconveyance and 
General Release, as set forth in that certain Settlement Agreement 
with Americai Savings and Loan Association and Terrace Falls 
Condominiums, dated October /^ , 1984, the undersigned Terrace 
Falls Condominiums and its general and limited partners do hereby 
agree to assign, transfer and convey to Margetts twenty percent 
(20%) of whatever they, or any of them, may ultimately receive, 
if anything, after the closing of the escrow under said Settlement 
Agreement, in the way of an interest in the Terrace Falls 
Condominiums Project or any portion thereof or in any proceeds 
from the sale of the Project or of any unit or interest therein 
or any right or option to acquire such an interest; provided, 
however, the value of what is assigned to Margetts hereunder shall 
not exceed One Hundred Thirty-Four Thousand Two Hundred Eighty-
Three Dollars ($134*283-^00) ; and provided, further, that except to 
the extent this Agreement may be construed as inconsistent with 
or as a modification of the aforesaid General Release, in which 
case this Agreement shall prevail, said General Release is hereby 
reconfirmed in all respects by Margetts. ^T^^^r^p^ccu^^f- >s *i.vir 
SIGNED this // day of November, 1984. "3-
<#9 
Mm 
TERRACE FALLS CONDOMINIUMS 
By: Wells Stevens Enterprises 
Its General Partner 
I>-Wells Steven* 
Its General Partner 
Harold K. Beecher & Associates 
-Harold K. Beecher, President 
°/ / / A^ /> ^ 
Harold K. Beecher, Individually 
Wells Stevens Enterprises 
By: 
I."P7§lls Stevens, Jr 
General Partner 
Stacey 
MARGETTS: 
r-r^j 
John L. Margetts, Individually 
/ . 
V ^ ^ AGREEMENT 
IN CONSIDERATION OF and as further inducement to the 
execution and delivery by John L. Margetts ("Margetts") of a 
Condominium Purchase Agreement, Request for Reconveyance and 
General Release, as set forth in that certain Settlement Agreement 
with American Savings and Loan Association and Terrace Falls 
Condominiums, dated October , 1984, the undersigned Terrace 
Falls Condominiums and its general and limited partners do hereby 
agree to assign, transfer and convey to Margetts twenty percent 
(20%) of whatever they, or any of them, may ultimately receive, 
if anything, after the closing of the escrow under said Settlement 
Agreement, in the way of an interest in the Terrace Falls 
Condominiums Project or any portion thereof or in any proceeds 
from the sale of the project or of any unit or interest therein 
or any right .or option to acquire such an interest; provided, 
however, the value of what is assigned to Margetts hereunder shall 
not exceed One Hundred Thirty-Four Thousand Two Hundred Eighty-
Three Dollars ($134,283.00); and provided, further, that except to 
the extent this Agreement may be construed as inconsistent with 
or as a modification of the aforesaid General Release, in which 
case this Agreement shall prevail, said General Release is hereby 
reconfirmed in all respects by Margetts. 
SIGNED this S^S day of November, 1984. 
TERRACE FALLS CONDOMINIUMS 
By: Wells Stevens Enterprises 
Its General Partner 
By: 
I. Wells Stevens 
Its General Partner 
Harold K. Beecher & Assoc: ites 
By: 
Harold K. Beecher, Presic nt 
Harold K. Beecher, Individually7 
Wells Stevens Enterprises 
By: 
I . Wells S tevens , J r . 
*tf-a/ &fei^ £&cf<. 
STATUTES AND RULES TO BE INTERPRETED 
Utah Code Annotated 
§78-36-3 Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than life. 
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful 
detainer: 
(a) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the 
property or any part of it, after the expiration of the specified term or period for 
which it is let to him, which specified term or period, whether established by 
express or implied contract, or whether written or parol, shall be terminated 
without notice at the expiration of the specified term or period; 
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with monthly 
or other periodic rent reserved: 
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant after the 
end of any month or period, in cases where the owner, his designated agent, 
or any successor in estate of the owner, 15 days or more prior to the end of 
that month or period, has served notice requiring him to quit the premises at 
the expiration of that month or period; or 
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in possession of 
the premises after the expiration of a notice of not less than five days; 
(c) when he continues in possession in person or by subtenant, after 
default in the payment of any rent and after a notice in writing requiring in the 
alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the detained premises, 
has remained uncomplied with for a period of three days after service, which 
notice may be served at any time after the rent becomes due; 
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased premises contrary to the 
covenants of the lease, or commits or permits waste on the premises, or when 
he sets up or carries on any unlawful business on or in the premises, or when 
he suffers, permits, or maintains on or about the premises any nuisance, and 
remains in possession after service upon him of a three days' notice to quit; or 
(e) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after a 
neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or 
agreement under which the property is held, other than those previously 
mentioned, and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the 
performance of the conditions or covenant or the surrender of the property, 
served upon him and upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the 
premises remains uncomplied with for three days after service. Within three 
days after the service of the notice, the tenant, any subtenant in actual 
occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of the term, or other person 
interested in its continuance may perform the condition or covenant and 
thereby save the lease from forfeiture, except that if the covenants and 
conditions of the lease violated by the lessee cannot afterwards be 
performed, then no notice need be given. 
§78-36-6 Notice to quit - How served. 
The notices required by the preceding sections may be served: 
(1) by delivering a copy to the tenant personally; 
(2) by sending a copy through registered or certified mail addressed to the 
tenant at his place of residence; 
(3) if he is absent from his lace of residence or from his usual place of 
business, by leaving a copy with a person of suitable age and discretion at 
either place and mailing a copy to the tenant at the address of his place of 
residence or place of business; or 
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found at the place of 
residence, then by affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the leased 
property. Service upon a subtenant may be made in the same manner. 
§78-36-10 Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent - Immediate 
enforcement - Treble damages. 
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon default. A 
judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff shall include an order for the 
restitution of the premises. If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after 
neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or 
agreement under which the property is held, or after default in the pi ment of 
rent, the judgment shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease or agre nent. 
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or up. i the 
defendant's default, shall also assess the damages resulting to the p. itiff 
from any of the following: 
(a) forcible entry; 
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; 
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is 
alleged in the complaint and proved at trial; and 
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after 
default in the payment of rent. 
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for 
three times the amount of the damages assessed under Subsections (2) (a) 
through (2)(c), and for reasonable attorney's fees, if they are provided for in 
the lease or agreement. 
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default in the payment of 
the rent, execution upon the judgment shall be issued immediately after the 
entry of the judgment. In all cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced 
immediately. 
